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 ABSTRACT 
An Examination of How Personality Traits and Implicit Theories of Intelligence Affect 
Metacognitive Control Over Study-Time Allocation 
Amie Diana Wolf 
 
Effective monitoring and control over one’s thinking, or effective metacognition, is a 
central component to many cognitive tasks and thus is essential to optimize learning (Metcalfe, 
1993; Paul, 1992; Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Schneider & Lockl, 2002; Simon & 
Newell, 1971; Willingham, 2007). Many factors impact how strategies are implemented. We 
know a good deal about the cognitive variables that affect implementation of cognitive strategies, 
but nothing about personality or motivational traits that contribute to effective metacognitive 
strategy use. This study aimed to explore and clarify the relationship between personality traits, 
implicit theories of intelligence (Dweck, 1999) and metacognitive control over study time 
allocation and subsequent test performance. The independent variables included the personality 
traits described in the Five Factor model (McCrae & Costa, 1997; Neuroticism, Extraversion, 
Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness) and participants’ implicit theories of 
intelligence (entity or incremental theory), as well as one between-subjects factor, which was 
time allotted to study passages, or time pressure (High Time Pressure vs. Low Time Pressure). 
The dependent variables included test performance and metacognitive strategy used. This study 
used a study-time allocation paradigm similar to the design used in the Son and Metcalfe (2000) 
study, where participants first ranked passages based on difficulty and interest, then studied the 
passages under either high or low time pressure. Participants were tested on their understanding 
of the material after studying. Participants also completed self-report measures of personality and 
implicit theories of intelligence. Primary findings revealed that participants high on 
 Conscientiousness allocated more study-time to passages judged as interesting compared to 
participants who were average or low on Conscientiousness. Additionally, when faced with time 
constraints, participants who identified with an incremental theory of intelligence were more 
likely to allocate study-time to passages judged as interesting compared to participants who did 
not identify with an incremental theory of intelligence. Openness was positively related to test 
performance, and Extraversion was negatively related to test performance. Lastly, the trait 
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Metacognition, a central component of higher order cognitive functioning, is widely 
accepted as having an impact on memory and learning outcomes (Dunlosky & Ariel, 2011; 
Metcalfe, 1993; Metcalfe, 2009; Paul, 1992; Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Schneider & 
Locke, 2002; Simon & Newell, 1971; Willingham, 2007). While there is growing evidence to 
support how metacognitions guide our study behavior, there is little research explaining 
individual differences in metacognition that might inhibit or enhance these strategies. A better 
understanding of such differences in how people regulate their learning and achievement through 
metacognitive judgments is needed.  
Previous research has utilized a study-time-allocation paradigm in order to gain a better 
understanding of different metacognitive control strategies. The Discrepancy Reduction Model 
was the first model to explain how metacognitions guide our study behavior, where people focus 
primarily on the most difficult items while studying in order to reduce the discrepancy between 
what they wish to learn and what they have already learned. They then proceed to the easier 
items once they feel they have mastered the difficult items (Dunlosky & Herztog, 1998; Nelson 
& Narens, 1990). In these studies, participants are typically presented with word pairs and given 
the choice as to which pairs to study first, and how long to study each pair. However, when 
people are tested under more realistic learning situations than the conditions used in studies that 
support the Discrepancy Reduction Model, data now support a Region of Proximal Learning 
model (Ariel, Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009; Metcalfe, 2002; Metcalfe, 2009; Metcalfe & Kornell, 
2003). Results supporting this model have found that when complete mastery of material is not 
possible, people choose to study unfamiliar items they view as easy first, followed by the most 
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difficult items. People tend to not study items that are already known. Further, they will 
persevere in studying until they no longer perceive themselves as learning.  
Son and Metcalfe (2000) conducted a series of experiments that supported the Region of 
Proximal Learning model. Generally they found that when faced with varied time pressure (i.e., 
high versus moderate time pressure) or test expectations (i.e., studying for a test versus free 
reading), people’s strategies changed. In these experiments, participants were presented with 
passages, as opposed to paired-associates, that varied in difficulty and asked to order each 
passage in terms of its perceived ease of learning. Then, during a study phase, they had to choose 
which passages to study first, and how long to study each passage. They were subsequently 
tested on the material. When people were given ample time to study all stimulus materials, 
people allocated more study time to judged-difficult items. In contrast, under high time pressure, 
where people were not given enough time to study all of the stimulus materials, they found that 
people allocated more study time to judged-easy items and tended to study judged-easy items 
first to optimize test performance. People did not show a preference in study-time allocation (i.e., 
choosing to study difficult or easy items first) under moderate time pressure, suggesting they 
were not making metacognitive decisions in terms of what to study. The use of passages, 
presence of time pressure, and the expectation of a test are arguably more reflective of real world 
studying and learning conditions.  
Most of the research on how students monitor their studying has focused on some 
cognitive and situational variables that affect metacognitive functioning, such as difficulty of 
passages, time, and the expectation of a test. There is little research on the influence of affect on 
metacognitive strategies. This dissertation will investigate how affective variables, namely 
personality traits and motivation, will influence metacognitive control over study time while 
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learning passages of varying difficulty when they are expecting a test under either high time 
pressure or low time pressure in an attempt to address these issues.  
Most of the personality variables associated with academic outcomes are contained in the 
Five Factor model, which is widely accepted as a comprehensive representation of adult 
personality traits (Goldberg, 1990; Hendriks, Perugini, Angletiner, Ostendorf, Johnson, De 
Fruyt…Nagy, 2003; McCrae & Costa, 1987; Saucier & Goldberg, 1996). The five factors 
include, Extraversion (sociable, friendly, dominant), Agreeableness (cooperative, helpful, 
trustworthy), Conscientiousness (careful, reliable, hardworking) Neuroticism (nervous, high-
strung, emotional), and Openness (intellectual, independent-minded, imaginative). Of the five, 
Conscientiousness is the trait most consistently associated with better study skills, higher 
academic achievement, and test performance (Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2003b; Conrad, 
2006; Furnham & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2004; Graziano & Ward, 1992; Noftle & Robins, 2007; 
Porporat, 2009).  Though there is a relationship between Openness and academic achievement, 
Openness is found to be more related to intelligence and aptitude than achievement (Ackerman 
& Heggested, 1997; Conrad 2006; Goff & Ackermann, 1992; Noftle & Robbins, 2001). The 
relationship between the other three factors and academic achievement is somewhat unclear. 
Some research indicates a negative relationship between extraversion (Bauer & Liang, 2003; 
Furnam, Chamorro-Premuzic & McDougall, 2003; Goff and Ackerman, 1992) and neuroticism 
(Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2003; Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2005) on academic 
outcomes, while other research does not (O’Connor & Paunonen, 2009; Rothstein, 1994). 
Additionally, in some studies agreeableness was associated with academic performance (Farsides 
& Woodfield, 2003), and other studies did not find a significant relationship (Conrad, 2006; 
Porporat, 2009; Rothstein, 1994).  
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Despite the positive relationship between metacognition and learning, as well as learning 
and Conscientiousness, there might be a negative relationship between effective metacognitive 
strategies and Conscientiousness under certain circumstances. Firstly, there is speculation that 
Conscientiousness serves as a compensatory mechanism for average intelligence, in that 
individuals who are high on Conscientiousness are high achievers despite average cognitive 
abilities (Moutafi, Furnham, & Crump, 2003; Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2004; Wood & 
Englert, 2009). As such, it is possible that Conscientiousness is also compensatory for higher 
order cognitive skills, such as metacognition and a person’s ability to make judgments about 
their own learning. In one study examining the association between personality traits and 
academic performance, the authors found a negative relationship between Conscientiousness and 
critical thinking skills (Bauer & Liang, 2003). Critical thinking is potentially analogous to higher 
order cognitive functioning abilities, such as metacognition. Secondly, it is possible that 
characteristics associated with Conscientiousness (e.g., organized, cautious, rule-following), may 
mitigate against the use of effective decision-making under high time pressure studying 
situations. Cucina and Vasilopulos (2005) found that very high levels of Conscientiousness were 
associated with lower grades because high conscientious individuals can take on too much at 
once or attempt to complete all assigned tasks, rather setting goals and prioritizing tasks. The 
relationship between Conscientiousness and metacognitive control warrants further investigation.  
 In addition to personality, research has shown that there is an association among 
motivation, task performance and metacognitive strategy use. This dissertation used Dweck’s 
research on implicit theories of intelligence to operationalize motivation since there are 
supported associations between how people’s theories about their own intelligence impact their 
interpretations of how well they understand and comprehend new material. Specifically, the 
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implicit theory of intelligence states that people’s beliefs about their own intelligence potentially 
alters their judgments of learning when faced with tasks of varying difficulty, which in turn 
impacts their effort (Dweck,1999; Molden & Dweck, 2006).  
Judgments of learning are a measure of an individual’s metacognitive assessments of 
memory and comprehension.  Entity theorists, or people who believe intelligence is a fixed, 
stable entity tend to interpret difficult tasks as an indication of a lack of innate ability (Dweck, 
1999). As such, when presented with a difficult task, research indicates these individuals report 
lower levels of perceived understanding of the material (Miele & Molden, 2010). In contrast, 
incremental theorists, or people who believe intelligence is a malleable construct that can be 
developed, tend to interpret difficult tasks as an indication that more effort is required to 
complete the task. Since they put forth more effort in a difficult task, these individuals report 
higher levels of perceived understanding. While this research indicates that implicit theories of 
intelligence impact metacognitive judgments of learning, or assessments of understanding, 
whether or not one belief about intelligence is superior to another in terms of metacognitive 
ability is unclear. This is supported by no differences in actual understanding of material 
between entity and incremental theorists in past research despite differences in perceived 
understanding (Miele & Molden, 2010).  
Though there is no current research on how implicit theories impact metacognitive 
strategies, there is reason to believe there may be a negative association between an incremental 
view and metacognition. A paramount characteristic of incrementalists is increased effort when 
faced with difficult tasks. This increased effort potentially impacts the understanding of how well 
they learned a difficult item and their subsequent studying decisions. Effort to persevere on 
challenging items might actually be an ineffective study strategy, as indicated by the Region of 
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Proximal Learning Model.  Relatedly, people who scored high on Conscientiousness were more 
likely to report an incremental theory of intelligence (Furnham, et al., 2003). Given the 
association between Conscientiousness and implicit theories of intelligence, and an inconclusive 
relationship between implicit theories of intelligence and metacognition, a better understanding 
of how these factors are related to metacognitive strategies in terms of study time allocation is 
needed. The purpose of this dissertation was to explore and clarify the relationship between 
personality traits, motivational variables, and metacognitive strategies on study-time allocation 



















REVIEW OF RESEARCH 
Metacognition and Study-Time Allocation 
The construct of metacognition is a central component of higher order cognitive 
functioning that consists of the knowledge and regulation of one’s own thinking, or the 
monitoring and control of one’s own cognitions (Dunlosky & Ariel, 2011; Flavell, 1979; Nelson 
& Narens, 1990). Many theories support that effective metacognition is a central component to 
many cognitive tasks, such as memory (Metcalfe, 1993; Reder, 1987; Reder & Ritter, 1992), 
declarative and procedural knowledge (Schneider & Lockl, 2002), problem solving (Simon & 
Newell, 1971), and other critical thinking skills (Paul, 1992; Willingham, 2007). Although we 
know a great deal about the relationship of metacognition to memory and other cognitive 
processes, we still have a lot to learn about how we self-regulate knowledge acquisition through 
monitoring and control in order to optimize learning. Nelson and Narens (1990) introduced a 
theoretical framework of metacognition that explained self-regulation through monitoring and 
control of cognitions. Within this framework, an individual’s cognitive processes are split into a 
meta-level and an object-level. Information, or knowledge, flows between these levels. Within 
the meta-level, there is a mental representation of the object-level. The meta-level continuously 
tracks incoming information and uses this information to regulate whether the mental 
representation of the object-level needs to be modified. The tracking of incoming information is 
referred to as monitoring, and the decisions made about what to do with the information (i.e., 
modify the object-level representation or keep it the same) are referred to as control. Since 
learning in an academic context is often the product of studying, research has focused on the role 
of monitoring and control in guiding how people study and subsequently learn (Dunlosky & 
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Herztog, 1997; Metcalfe & Cornell, 2005; Nelson & Narens, 1994). Individuals differ in their 
capacity to monitor their own learning, as well as their capacity to control, or regulate, what they 
do with this information through various strategies (Dunlosky & Thiede, 2013; Nelson & 
Dunlosky, 1991). While there is evidence supporting the link between monitoring, control and 
learning, there is little research examining individual differences that might affect this 
relationship. 
Investigations of monitoring have looked at factors that affect judgments of whether an 
individual knows something or not, and whether these judgments are accurate (e.g., Higman. 
2013; van Loon et al., 2013). Two widely used terms to describe an individual’s ability to 
monitor their learning are ease of learning (EOL) judgments, or judgments of ease of acquisition 
(Richardson & Erlenbacher, 1958) and judgments of learning (JOL), or judgments of how well 
information is learned (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). The accuracy of judgments made while 
studying, or effective monitoring, is important because people use them to decide how to control 
their studying.  The learner decides which information to study and how long to study it. As 
such, this relationship has been investigated using a study-time allocation paradigm. Studies have 
supported the relationship between accurate judgments and effective control decisions, since 
subjective ease of material is positively correlated with JOLs. The ability to make accurate 
judgments of learning impacts their ability to successfully guide their decisions while studying, 
such as what to study and how long to study it (Dunlosky & Rawson, 2012; Higman, 2013, 
Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Thiede and Dunloskly, 1999, van Loon et al., 2013). Effective 
metacognitive control does enhance learning (Kornell & Metcalfe, 2006; Thiede et al., 2003). 
However, some studies have found adults are not good at making accurate judgments of learning 
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(Koriat & Bjork, 2005; Peverly, Brobst, Graham, & Shaw, 2003; Pressley & Ghatala, 1988; 
Presseley, Ghatala, Woloshyn, & Pirie, 1990), which has implications for their study strategies.  
Early research supported an inverse relationship between monitoring judgments and the 
amount of allocated study time, in that the lower the perceived EOL of a particular item, the 
greater the allocated study time to that item (Nelson & Leonesio, 1988). Further research on this 
relationship gave rise to the Discrepancy Reduction model of self-regulated study (Dunlosky & 
Herztog, 1998). According to the model, people set a goal for learning then select items to study.  
They continue to study, monitor and test their understanding of the item until they meet or 
exceed their desired goal of learning, and there is no longer a perceived discrepancy between 
their desired and current state of learning.  They then move on to the next item. People study the 
most difficult items first since they represent the greatest discrepancy between their desired and 
current state of learning (Dunlosky & Thiede, 1998; Nelson & Narens, 1990).  
Though the Discrepancy Reduction model makes sense, in that people choose to study 
those items they perceive as most difficult first and will continue to study until the material is 
mastered, there are a few inherent problems with the model and the design of the research. 
Firstly, participants in the earliest studies had unlimited time to study the material so they were 
able to devote as much time as they desired to items perceived as most difficult. Real-life testing 
or studying situations, as well as certain personality tendencies (i.e., procrastination), may not 
afford participants the luxury of time, which likely impacts an individuals’ study-time allocation. 
Secondly, the goal in most of the studies of the Discrepancy Reduction model was total mastery, 
or complete verbatim recall. Most of these studies required participants to memorize short 
materials, such as word pairs. However, it is not always possible to completely master all 
material. For example, some findings suggest a “labor-in-vain” effect, which indicated that 
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despite allocating extra study time to perceived difficult items, there was little to no increase in 
recall (Mazzoni & Cornoldi, 1993; Nelson & Leonesio, 1988). Similarly, total mastery, or 
complete recall, might not always be the learning goal. While some tasks require mastery (e.g., 
learning a new language), others do not (e.g., understanding the meaning of text).  
These limitations to the Discrepancy Reduction model led to alternative models, and data 
now support a Region of Proximal Learning model (Ariel, Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009; Kornell & 
Metcalfe, 2006, Metcalfe, 2002; Metcalfe, 2009; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2003), which better 
explains people’s study-time allocation during more realistic testing situations. According to this 
model, under time pressure, people select easy items they do not know first over the difficult 
items they do not know, and do not study items they already know (Son, 2004). This is arguably 
an effective strategy because if they do not have enough time to study and learn all material, their 
ability to master easy (but unknown) material is more likely than their ability to master difficult 
material. Once people choose which items to study and the order in which they will study them, 
they need to decide when to stop studying an item. The rule for stopping studying, or 
perseverance, is based on a person’s judgment of the rate of their own learning (jROL), and was 
first introduced in the Region of Proximal Learning model (Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005). When 
people have unlimited time, which makes it possible to master difficult items, their study-time 
allocation reflects predictions made by the Discrepancy Reduction model. People will choose to 
study the difficult items first and will allocate more study time to difficult items (Koriat et al., 
2006, Son & Metcalfe, 2000). 
In addition to time constraints, real-life studying and testing conditions require the 
understanding of longer tests or passages. Son and Metcalfe (2000) investigated how people’s 
metacognitive judgments influence study-time allocation strategies under realistic testing 
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conditions. This study consisted of three experiments. Experiment 1 manipulated the test 
expectations of the participants to investigate whether participants who were expecting a test 
(study-for-test group) would allocate study time differently than participants who were reading 
for no purpose (free reading group), when given insufficient time to study all materials. The 
materials consisted of eight biographies, and participants were first required to rank the 
biographies in terms of EOL and judgments of interest (JOI). Participants’ interest is important 
because it potentially impacts their views as to whether they believe the information is useful 
and/or relevant. They were then allotted 30 minutes to study the biographies. The study-for-test 
group was told they would be tested on the material and the free reading group was not. All 
participants were subsequently tested on the material. Experiment 2 replicated the test 
expectation manipulation of Experiment 1 and participants again had to make EOL and JOI 
judgments about the materials. However, study materials included haiku poems rather than 
lengthy biographies and allotted more study time than needed to read the poems to support 
previous findings that people will choose to study difficult items first with shorter materials and 
without time pressure. Experiment 3 further examined the impact of time pressure on study time 
using a similar design to the prior two experiments, where participants had to make JOI and EOL 
judgments, with the exception of manipulating the amount of time allotted to study (high time 
pressure and moderate time pressure) and using sonnets that were longer than the haiku poems 
but shorter than the biographies.  
Primary findings across the three experiments indicated that 1) under high time pressure, 
people allocated more study time to judged-easy items than judged-difficult items, 2) under 
moderate time pressure, people did not show a preference in study-time allocation, 3) when 
people were studying for a test and not under significant time pressure, they were more likely to 
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allocate study time to judged-difficult items than people who were free reading, and 4) people’s 
JOI and EOL judgments were significantly correlated, which means material that was judged 
easy was also judged as interesting, but people allocated more study time to judged-interesting 
material over judged-easy material when they were not expecting a test. These findings suggest 
that the strategies people choose are a function of time, knowledge they are being tested, and the 
materials they are studying. Subsequent research has replicated the findings that people allocate 
more study time to difficult items under less time constraints (Koriat & Nussinson, 2009; Koriat 
et al., 2006; Metcalfe, 2002). 
Though research supports that people tend to allocate more study time to judged-easy 
items when faced with time pressure, is this an effective strategy that actually increases learning? 
Kornell and Metcalfe (2006) conducted a series of three experiments which supported that 
people’s metacognitive control over study-time allocation does effectively increase learning. 
Further, findings from one of the experiments indicated that people chose to study easy 
unlearned items, supporting a Region of Proximal Learning model, and this strategy benefited 
learning as indicated by increased test performance. The data suggests choosing to study easier 
items is effective in enhancing learning because when people know there is not enough time to 
learn material, easier items will take less time to learn and therefore will be more effective in 
boosting test performance.  
Although research suggests that people have the capacity to use their metacognitive 
judgments strategically, many factors impact how strategies are implemented. Given what we 
know about studying under realistic testing conditions, namely, studying longer material under 
time pressure, how might non-cognitive factors affect a person’s capacity to effectively monitor 
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and make control decisions? This dissertation attempted to clarify the relationship between non-
cognitive factors, namely personality traits and motivation, and metacognitive strategies.  
 
Personality Traits and Study-Time Allocation 
There is little research on the impact of non-cognitive factors on the effectiveness of 
metacognitive strategies, but there is research that suggests personality traits and other non-
cognitive factors predict academic performance (Rothstein, Paunonen, Rush, & King, 1994). The 
impact of personality traits on academic performance outcomes are of interest because 
personality measures predict what an individual will do, or their typical performance, as opposed 
to what they can do, or their maximal performance (Goff & Ackerman, 1992). There is growing 
evidence to support the use of non-cognitive constructs, such as personality measures, to 
supplement cognitive measures as predictors for work and college performance (Oswald et al., 
2004; Conrad, 2006) since many studies have illustrated that intellectual ability alone does not 
predict performance well (Ackerman, 1996; Wolf & Johnson, 1995, Chamorro-Premuzic & 
Furnham, 2006). If personality traits are a predictor of academic outcomes, it is possible they 
also predict a person’s capacity to use metacognitive strategies while studying.  
Most of the personality variables associated with academic performance are contained in 
the Five Factor model, which is widely accepted as a comprehensive representation of adult 
personality traits (Goldberg, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1987). This model has been validated in 
many cultures and languages (Hendriks et al, 2003; Saucier & Goldberg, 1996). The Five Factor 
model includes the following dimensions: Extraversion (sociable, friendly, dominant), 
Agreeableness (cooperative, helpful, trustworthy), Conscientiousness (careful, reliable, 
hardworking) Neuroticism (nervous, high-strung, emotional), and Openness (intellectual, 
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independent-minded, imaginative). Conscientiousness is the personality dimension most related 
to academic outcomes. The relationship between the other four dimensions and academic 
performance is inconclusive.  
Most studies have found a positive relationship between Conscientiousness and academic 
performance, both in terms of GPA (Conrad, 2006; Porporat, 2009; Noftle & Robins, 2007) and 
exam scores (Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2003b; Furnham & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2004). 
These findings hold true when controlling for academic ability, and also are equally predictive of 
academic performance as intelligence or ability measures (Porporat, 2009). Although most of 
these data were gathered using self-report measures, research also supports an association 
between teacher ratings of Conscientiousness and school performance (Graziano & Ward, 1992).  
It is logical that people high on Conscientiousness perform better in school, since this 
construct contains many traits that describe the ideal student and worker. Specifically, some of 
the many traits Hogan and Ones (1997) used to define Conscientiousness include hardworking, 
ambitious, organized, cautious, willing to comply with current rules, cooperative, and 
dependable. Further, this construct is arguably related to persistence, or the will to achieve 
(Digman, 1989). Webb (1915) described the will to achieve as the w factor, which is associated 
with academic performance (De Raad & Schowenburg, 1996) and sustained effort and goal 
setting (Barrick et al., 1993). Lastly, Conscientiousness is highly correlated with other socially 
desirable behaviors in the classroom beyond performance, such as attendance and participation 
(O’Connor & Paunonen, 2007). In other words, people who are conscientious are motivated and 
hardworking, and these qualities suggest such individuals will perform well in school. 
Despite generally consistent findings that show a relationship between Conscientiousness 
and academic performance, a meta-analysis conducted by O’Connor and Paunonen (2007) 
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indicated substantial variability in the strength of this relationship across studies, and there is one 
study that did not find any relationship (Farsides & Woodfield, 2003). Further, there is some 
research that suggests that extremely high levels of Conscientiousness may have a negative 
affect on academic performance. Cucina and Vasilopulos (2005) found a quadratic relationship 
between Conscientiousness and GPA, such that students rated either extremely high or extremely 
low on this personality trait had lower GPA’s than students rated either moderate or moderate-to-
high.  
Overall, there is evidence to support a strong relationship between Conscientiousness and 
academic performance. However, there may be reason to believe that there is a negative 
relationship between Conscientiousness and the use of effective metacognitive strategies while 
studying for a test under some conditions. First, while individuals high on Conscientiousness 
arguably perform better academically, there is evidence that those who self-reported high 
Conscientiousness scored lower on intelligence tests (Chamorro-Premuzic, et al., 2004; Wood & 
Englert, 2009). As such, there is speculation that this dimension serves as a compensatory 
mechanism for low-to-average intelligence (Moutafi et al., 2003; Chamorro-Premuzic & 
Furnham, 2004) and low critical thinking skills (Bidjerano & Dai, 2007). One study examining 
the association between personality traits and academic performance found a negative 
relationship between Conscientiousness and critical thinking skills (Bauer & Liang, 2003), 
though it is of note the authors argued this finding was a function of students’ lack of motivation 
during the study. If Conscientiousness serves as a compensatory mechanism for higher order 
cognitive skills, then it is possible Conscientiousness is compensatory for the effective use of 
metacognitive decision-making while studying. 
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Secondly, as discussed previously, those high on Conscientiousness are described as hard 
working, organized, cautious, and rule-following (Hogan & Ones, 1997). It is possible that under 
time pressure, such individuals will struggle to use monitoring to make effective control 
decisions while studying, since choosing to study everything assigned as opposed to making 
decisions about what and what to not study is better aligned with Conscientious traits (e.g., rule-
following). Given the evidence that high (and low) levels of Conscientiousness might be related 
to lower academic performance, it is possible that students high on Conscientiousness attempt to 
complete all tasks, or take on too much at once (Cucina & Vasilopoulos, 2005). Similarly, there 
is evidence that individuals who are achievement-oriented (or having Type A characteristics) 
performed worse than individuals who did not have these characteristics, or had them to a lesser 
degree (or having Type B characteristics) when faced with several tasks of equal importance. 
Type A individuals attempted to complete all of the tasks simultaneously (De le Casa et al, 
1997).  
Further, there is some support for a positive relationship between Conscientiousness and 
self-regulated learning strategies, including metacognition (Blickle, 1996). However, there is 
also evidence this relationship is mediated by effort regulation and moderated by Openness, such 
that individuals high on Conscientiousness and low on Openness were more likely to invest more 
time and effort (Bidjerano & Dai, 2007). 
Unlike Conscientiousness, the relationship between the other four factors and academic 
outcomes are not as straightforward. Some studies have found a positive relationship between 
Openness to Experience and academic performance, as measured by GPA (Farsides & 
Woodfield, 2003) and final grades (Lounsbury et al., 2003; Lounsbury et al., 2005). This 
association is explained by Openness as being more related to academic ability or aptitude, 
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where the association between Conscientiousness and academic performance is more related to 
motivation or perseverance (Goff & Ackermann, 1992; Noftle & Robbins, 2001; Conrad 2006). 
Similarly, some researchers argue that Openness to Experience overlaps highly with intellectual 
ability (Ackerman & Heggested, 1997). The relationship between aptitude and Openness is 
supported by the idea that people high on Openness are more likely to engage in abstract 
thinking and other intellectual activities (Saucier & Goldberg, 1996). Though some studies have 
supported the relationship between Openness and academic performance, other studies have 
failed to find a significant relationship (Busato et al., 1999; Rothstien et al., 1994, Wolfe & 
Johnson, 1995). 
Similar to Openness to Experience, associations between Extraversion and academic 
performance are inconclusive. While some studies have found a negative relationship between 
Extraversion and academic performance, others have either found no significant relationship or 
even a positive relationship. The variation in results is best explained by how academic 
performance is operationalized. For instance, a positive relationship between Extraversion and 
academic performance in MBA students was found when performance was based on 
participation (Rothstein, 1994), whereas a negative relationship was found when examining GPA 
(Bauer & Liang, 2003, Furnam et al., 2003, Goff and Ackerman, 1992) and exam grades (Hair & 
Hampson, 2006; Furnham & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2004). Arguably students high on 
Extraversion spend more time socializing, both during and outside of class, whereas individuals 
low on Extraversion (or introverts) spend more time studying (Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 
2005). 
According to a meta-analysis conducted by O’Connor and Paunonen (2009) there is little 
evidence to support an association between Neuroticism (or Emotional Stability) and academic 
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performance. The few studies that do support a relationship revealed a negative correlation 
between Neuroticism and GPA (Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2003). Students high on 
Neuroticism (or low on Emotional Stability) are more likely to experience anxiety and stress 
which impacts their academic performance (Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2005). Lastly, 
Agreeableness is the dimension least related to academic performance, although there are some 
findings that indicate a positive association between Agreeableness and final grades (Conrad, 
2006), as well as GPA (Farsides & Woodfield, 2003), although others found a negative 
association (Rothstein, 1994). 
 
Implicit Theories of Intelligence and Study-Time Allocation 
Similar to personality variables, there is little research on the relationship between 
motivational variables and metacognitive strategies, but there is a supported relationship between 
certain motivational models and academic outcomes.  One such motivational model indicates 
that people’s beliefs about intelligence impact their response to academic challenges (Dweck, 
1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). This model is particularly of interest because people’s theories 
about their own intelligence impact their interpretations of how well they understand and 
comprehend new material, as well as their perception of their capability to understand new 
material, which might then impact metacognitive decisions while studying.  
According to this model of implicit theories of intelligence, people have different beliefs 
about the nature of intelligence. Some people hold an “entity” theory of intelligence, meaning 
they believe intelligence is a fixed, stable entity, and tend interpret difficult tasks as an indication 
of a lack of innate ability. In contrast, some people hold an “incremental” theory of intelligence, 
meaning they believe intelligence is a malleable construct that can be developed, and tend to 
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interpret difficult tasks as an indication that more effort is required to complete the task (Dweck 
& Leggett, 1988, Dweck, 1999).  
Research supports that these beliefs have implications for students’ academic outcomes, 
specifically how they respond to challenging tasks or failure, and are independent of actual 
intellectual ability. These beliefs alter people’s JOLs when faced with difficult tasks, which in 
turn impacts their effort (Dweck, 1999; Molden & Dweck, 2006).  When faced with an academic 
challenge or setback, incremental theorists put forth effort to build skill acquisition and 
overcome difficulty, whereas entity theorists withdraw or give up because they believe they do 
not have enough intelligence to overcome difficulty (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Further, 
incremental theorists tend to have learning goals, which focus on increasing competence. 
Conversely, entity theorists tend to have performance goals, which focus on gaining favorable 
judgments from others of their competence, and these goals facilitate different response patterns 
to setbacks (Dweck & Leggett). Performance goals can lead to responses of helplessness, 
whereas learning goals, which support mastery-oriented strategies and challenges, are associated 
with increased effort and/or the adaptation of strategies (Elliott & Dweck, 1988)  
Studies have found that students with a more incremental view earned higher grades than 
students with a more entity view (Henderson & Dweck, 1990). Similarly, Blackwell and 
colleagues (2007) found that an incremental view in junior high school students predicted an 
upward trajectory in grades, where an entity view predicted a flat trajectory. Further, there is 
evidence that implicit theories of intelligence can be taught and manipulated in the classroom. In 
one study, college students who were taught an incremental view earned higher grades and 
achievement test scores than the control group, even when controlling for aptitude (Aronson, 
Fried, & Good, 2002; Good, Aronson & Inzlicht, 2003). In another study, an intervention 
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teaching an incremental view of intelligence facilitated a change in motivation; students who 
received the intervention improved their grades whereas students in the control group’s grades 
continued to decline (Blackwell et al., 2007). The control group in this study received instruction 
on the structure of memory, as opposed to instruction on the incremental theory of intelligence.  
While there is a supported relationship between implicit theories of intelligence and 
academic outcomes, the relationship between theories of intelligence and metacognitive 
strategies is unclear. Some argue that metacognition and classroom motivation are related since 
effective metacognition includes self-monitoring and self-appraisal of learning, which impacts 
persistence or perseverance when faced with difficult tasks (Cross & Paris, 1988; Paris & 
Winograd, 1990). Self-appraisal is inherently an affective process since it involves the judgment 
of one’s own skills and abilities (Cross & Paris). If a student is studying material and makes the 
judgment that the material is difficult, motivation will impact whether they persist to learn the 
material (in concurrence with an incremental theory of intelligence). As such, some argue that 
metacognition is an important skill that fosters motivation in the classroom and should be 
developed (Paris & Winograd, 1990). While this makes sense in terms of promoting self-efficacy 
and perseverance, it is unclear how motivation might impact effective metacognitive strategy use 
when allocating study-time. 
While there is no research on how beliefs about intelligence impact metacognitive 
strategy use, there is evidence that beliefs about intelligence affect people’s interpretations of 
how well they comprehend easy or difficult material. Miele and Molden (2010) found that entity 
theorists reported lower levels of perceived understanding when reading difficult material, 
whereas incremental theorists reported higher levels of perceived understanding when faced with 
difficult material. These findings extended to both third and fifth grade students (Miele, Son, & 
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Metcalfe, 2013). The authors across both studies hypothesized that incremental theorists 
associate increased effort with developing a greater understanding of material, and since they 
exerted more effort as the task increased in difficulty, they perceived higher levels of 
understanding, or believed they understood the material more than they did. In contrast, entity 
theorists perceived increased effort when faced with difficulty as an indication they were 
reaching the limits of their ability to understand the material, so as effort and difficulty increased, 
their perceived understanding decreased. It is of note that across these studies, there were no 
differences in actual comprehension of the material despite differences in perceived 
understanding. This means both incremental and entity theorists used their experiences to judge 
their comprehension, but they interpreted their experiences differently.  
 Since research supports that differences in people’s beliefs about intelligence impact 
perceived understanding of material, these differences also likely impact how individuals 
allocate study time. However, which belief is superior is unclear since there are reasons to 
believe that both entity and incremental theories of intelligence may have a positive or negative 
impact on metacognitive strategies while studying for a test, depending on the conditions of 
studying (time, difficulty, etc.). As discussed previously, according to the Region of Proximal 
Learning model, an effective metacognitive strategy is to study easy material over difficult 
material under time pressure (Son & Metcalfe, 2000). Since entity theorists are more concerned 
with performance goals than incremental theorists, it is possible people with an entity theory of 
intelligence will choose to study judged-easy materials first, demonstrating effective study-time 
allocation decisions.  Another reason entity theorists might choose easy material is because they 
might be less confident in their ability to understand judged-difficult material and avoid studying 
difficult material altogether.  Conversely, incremental theorists are more concerned with learning 
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or mastery goals, which results in increased effort to persevere on challenging items. Since 
Molden and Dweck (2006) found that incremental theorists tend to interpret difficult tasks as an 
indication that more effort is required to complete the task, incremental theorists might choose to 
study judged-difficult items over judged-easy items. Also, if increased effort on challenging 
tasks results in incremental theorists reporting high levels of perceived understanding of test 
material, this might result in inaccurate monitoring of information.  Incremental theorists might 
perceive they understand something more than they do because of the effort put into the task, 
impacting subsequent studying decisions. Taken together, these findings suggest that incremental 
theorists might not engage in accurate monitoring and/or make effective control decisions while 
studying, and entity theorists might make more effective control decisions while studying, under 
some conditions.  
Further, research supports that people who scored high on Conscientiousness were more 
likely to report an incremental theory of intelligence (Furnham, et al., 2003). This makes sense 
because many traits associated with Conscientiousness are also associated with an incremental 
theory of intelligence (e.g., perseverance and effort). However, the similarities between people 
high on Conscientiousness and people with an incremental view of intelligence suggest 
incremental theorists might not make effective studying decisions under time pressure. 
Conversely, there are reasons to believe that an entity theory of intelligence might be 
negatively associated with effective metacognitive strategies, and an incremental theory of 
intelligence might be positively associated.  Entity theorists’ concern with their performance 
relative to others could suggest these they will choose to persevere on challenging or difficult 
material so they will not underperform relative to their peers. Incremental theorists’ focus on 
increasing competence through effort might suggest they are more apt to adapt strategies while 
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studying and might be more pragmatic in their study-time allocation.  Given the association 
between Conscientiousness and implicit theories of intelligence, and an inconclusive relationship 
between implicit theories of intelligence and metacognition, ultimately it is unclear how differing 
views of intelligence are related to study-time allocation under time pressure. A better 
understanding of how these factors are related to metacognitive strategies is needed and is one of 
the primary aims of this dissertation.  
 
The Current Study 
In summary, the aim of this dissertation is to explore and clarify the relationship between 
personality traits, motivational variables, and metacognitive control over study time allocation 
and subsequent test performance.  The personality traits of interest are the five traits in the Five 
Factor Model. While most research only supports a consistent relationship between 
Conscientiousness and academic achievement, and Conscientiousness is of most interest to this 
study, the other variables were still measured since there is little research investigating 
personality as it relates to metacognitive strategies. Additionally, measuring Conscientiousness 
in isolation will potentially prime subjects to the primary research questions. Finally, students’ 
beliefs about their own intelligence were also measured to determine if they lead to different 
strategic choices than would be predicted with the core personality construct of 
Conscientiousness. 
In order to reflect realistic studying conditions, this dissertation used a study-time 
allocation paradigm similar to the design used in the Son and Metcalfe (2000) study, where 
participants first ranked passages based on difficulty (EOL) and interest (JOI), then studied the 
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passages under either high or low time pressure, and lastly were tested on their understanding of 
the material.  
This study firstly aims to replicate the general study-time allocation findings from the 
Son and Metcalfe (2000) study, but additionally investigates the following research questions: 
(1) Is there a relationship between any of the Five Factor personality traits and metacognitive 
strategy used? (2) Is there a relationship between any of the Five Factor personality traits and test 
performance? (3) Is there a relationship between implicit views of intelligence and metacognitive 
strategy used? (4) Is there a relationship between implicit views of intelligence and test 
performance? (6) Is there an association between the Five Factor personality traits and implicit 
views of intelligence?  
Based on previous research, it is possible to generate hypotheses about some of the 
relationships among the aforementioned variables. As previously discussed, choosing to allocate 
more study time to easier items when faced with time constraints is considered an effective 
strategy in increasing test performance. Therefore, it is hypothesized H1) Under high time 
pressure, participants will allocate more study-time to judged-easy, where under low time 
pressure, participants will not show a preference for study-time allocation, regardless of their 
personality trait and/or beliefs about intelligence; H2) Under high time pressure, participants 
who score high on Conscientiousness will use less effective metacognitive strategies (i.e., will 
not choose to allocate more study time to judged-easy passages) compared to participants who 
score low on Conscientiousness; H3) Under high time pressure, students who identify with an 
incremental theory of intelligence will use less effective metacognitive strategies (i.e., will not 
choose to allocate more study time to judged-easy passages) compared to participants who 
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identify with an entity theory of intelligence; and H4) Students who identify with an incremental 



























 All participants were recruited in accordance with institutional review board procedures. 
Participants were undergraduate students from Columbia University enrolled in an introductory 
psychology class. Approximately two thirds of participants were recruited in one term (Spring 
2016) and the other third in a subsequent term (Fall 2016).  The students received course credit 
for their participation. No participants were excluded based on gender, race, or ethnicity. The 
original sample consisted of 127 students but two students were eliminated because their 
computer program crashed during the study and their experimental data could not be recovered. 
A third participant was eliminated because she did not follow instructions. The total sample used 
for the analyses was 124 participants. The mean age for the sample was 21.62 years (SD=4.17) 
and ranged from 18.00 to 32.75 years. Fifty-three percent of the sample was female (n = 66). 
Race/ethnicity reported by the participants was as follows: White American (31.4%), Asian 
American/Pacific Islander (30.6%), Multiple Races/Ethnicities (19.4%), Latino/a (9.7%) and 
Black/African American (8.9%). Twenty-three percent were declared psychology majors.  
 
Design  
The study replicated the general study-time allocation paradigm used in Son and Metcalfe 
(2000), with some modifications to address specific research questions. The design used in Son 
and Metcalfe consisted of a judgment phase, where participants rated written material for 
difficulty and interest, a studying phase, where participants were allotted a given an amount of 
time to study the material, and a testing phase, where participants were tested on the material 
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they studied. The main differences between the Son and Metcalfe study and this dissertation 
study are the: 1) administration of measures of affective variables (personality and motivation, 2) 
length of materials participants’ studied, and 3) memory test format. These differences are 
discussed in greater detail below. The main between-subjects manipulation, which is consistent 
with Son and Metcalfe, was the amount of time the participants were allotted to study materials 
(high time pressure vs. low time pressure). 
 
Materials  
 Most of the data were collected using a computer program to effectively capture 
participants’ studying behaviors and efficiently score materials. The personality questionnaire 
was a self-report measure filled out by hand since it is a standardized form that could not be 
replicated on the computer program for scoring purposes. Materials displayed with the computer 
program included a demographic questionnaire, a motivation questionnaire, the eight study 
passages, and a multiple-choice test.  
Demographics. The demographics questionnaire was used to collect information about 
participants’ gender, age, race/ethnicity, year in school, and GPA. There was also a question 
asking participants to provide their SAT scores. Studies have shown a significant correlation 
between SAT scores and cognitive ability (Frey & Determan, 2004), so participants’ SAT scores 
were used as a control for aptitude. However, Frey and Determan (2004) had access to university 
records so SAT scores were not self-reported, which is the case in the current study. Lastly, there 
was a question about whether participants are psychology majors.  
Five Factor Model of Personality. To measure the construct of personality, this study 
used the NEO Five-Factor Inventory-3 (NEO-FFI-3; McCrae & Costa, 2007), which is a 60-item 
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self-report questionnaire that provides a measure of the five domains of personality of 
adolescents and adults. The five domains include: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, 
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. Participants rated descriptive statements between 1 and 5 
(1 = Strongly Disagree and 5 = Strongly Agree) based on how true the statement is of them. 
Using the scoring criteria in the NEO-FFI-3 manual, participants’ self-reported raw scores across 
the five personality domains were converted to standardized T-scores. The T-scores for each of 
the five domains were then used to determine the qualitative description, which ranged from 
“Very Low” to “Very High.” Based on these ranges, the qualitative description was recoded into 
a numerical variable from 1 to 5, with 1 being “Very Low,” 2 being “Low,” 3 being “Average,” 
4 being “High,” and 5 being “Very High,” Participants who were considered low-to-average on 
Conscientiousness had ratings between 1 and 3, where participants who were considered high on 
Conscientiousness had ratings between 4 and 5. 
The NEO FFI-3 has high internal consistency (∝ =.78 -.86), and converges with the 
NEO-Personality Inventory from which the items were derived (McCrae, Costa, & Paul 2007), 
as well as other measures of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992). The internal consistency for 
each of the five scales, which consisted of 12 items for each scale, was as follows: Neuroticism 
(∝ = .82), Extraversion (∝ = .80), Openness (∝ = .78), Agreeableness (∝ = .72) and 
Conscientiousness (∝ = .83).  The internal consistency for the current sample was also high (∝ 
= .74, N = 124). The internal consistency for each of the five scales in the current sample was as 
follows: Neuroticism (∝ = .89), Extraversion (∝ = .84), Openness (∝ = .76), Agreeableness (∝ 
= .79), and Conscientiousness (∝ = .85). While the internal consistency reported by the authors 
of the NEO-FFI-3 and observed in the current sample was high, the reliability for Neuroticism, 
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Extraversion, and Conscientiousness was higher than the reliability for Conscientiousness and 
Agreeableness in both cases.  
Implicit Theories of Intelligence. To measure implicit theories of intelligence, the study 
used questions developed by Henderson, Dweck, and Chiu (1992). There are three items in total 
and they consist of statements that depict intelligence as a fixed entity. Participants rated each 
item on a scale of 1 to 6 based on their degree of agreement with each statement (with 1 = 
Strongly Agree and 6 = Strongly Disagree). The score was averaged, and an average score less 
than or equal to 3 is classified as having an entity theory of intelligence, where a score greater 
than or equal to 4 is classified as having an incremental theory of intelligence. Participants who 
scored between a three and four do not indicate a clear theory.  While there are questionnaires 
that include more than three items, Hong, Chiu, and Dweck (1994) argue that only three items 
are included because the items have the same meaning, and continued repetition of the same idea 
is potentially tedious. They report high internal consistency (∝ = .96, N = 50) and high test-retest 
reliability (r = .82, N=50).  The internal consistency for the sample in the current study was also 
high (∝ = .93, N = 124). A sample item includes, “You have a certain amount of intelligence and 
you really can’t do much to change it.” 
Passages. The passages selected for this study were chosen based on length and topic. 
First, the passages had to be long enough to reflect the more realistic studying conditions seen in 
the classroom, where total mastery of material while studying is not possible, but short enough 
that participants in the low time pressure studying condition could study all the materials 
completely.  Passages were also selected to capture a breadth of topics so there would be 
variability in reader interest and difficulty. The passages were taken from Wikipedia, which is an 
online public encyclopedia. Wikipedia is a freely licensed encyclopedia so its contents can be 
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copied and used for any purpose. There are a total of eight passages, and passage length ranged 
from 123 words to 193 words. Five graduate students (four female, one male) were instructed to 
select two passages on topics of interest, and as a group, they determined which eight best met 
the above conditions. The passage titles are: Angkor Wat, Emergency Banking Act, Infinite Jest, 
Magnetohydrodynamics, Rococo Movement, Succulent Plants, Video Game Addiction, and 
William T. G. Morton. Appendix E contains the passages.  
Pretesting of Passages. Data from the pilot study was used to determine the amount of 
study time allotted to the participants in each condition (high time pressure and low time 
pressure). The participants in the pilot were graduate students and were required to participate in 
all components of the current study. The only deviation was the amount of time allotted to each 
condition since one of the purposes of the pilot was to determine this. The goal of the high time 
pressure condition was to create a studying environment where the participants did not have 
enough time to study all of the passages. Conversely, the goal of the low time pressure condition 
was to create a studying environment where participants had enough time to comfortably read all 
of the passages. In the pilot study, participants in the low time pressure condition (n = 5) were 
given unlimited time to study the passages. The range of overall study time for participants in the 
low time pressure condition was 8 to 16 minutes, with a mean study time of 11.4 minutes. Since 
the purpose of the low time pressure condition is to allot sufficient time to participants to study 
all of the passages, the maximum amount of study time observed in the pilot study (16 minutes) 
was used for the low time pressure condition in the current study. 
Participants in the high time pressure condition (n = 5) were given nine minutes to study 
the passages.  The range of overall study time for participants in the high time pressure condition 
was 8 to 9 minutes, with a mean of 8.5 minutes. Since the purpose of the high time pressure 
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condition was to allot insufficient time to participants to study all of the passages, the minimum 
amount of time observed in the pilot study for studying (eight minutes) was used for the high 
time pressure condition in the dissertation study. 
Multiple Choice Test. The memory test consists of 48 multiple-choice questions based 
on the eight passages. There are six questions per passage. Four of the questions are memory 
items based on information stated explicitly in the text. Two of the questions for each passage 
are inference items that require participants to draw inferences in order to answer the questions. 
Two independent raters, who were psychology graduate students, rated question type (inference 
or memory item) to determine inter-rater agreement. The inter-rater reliability was high (r = .81, 
p <.01). Analysis of internal consistency for total test items yielded a Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient of 0.81 (N = 124), as was the internal consistency for the memory items, which 
yielded a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.74 (N = 124). Internal consistency for the inference 
items was lower, yielding a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.60 (N = 124).  
 
Procedure 
 The study occurred in one session. Participants were told the following about the study 
prior to participation: “You are invited to participate in a research study on individual differences 
in reading and studying. You will be asked to fill out questionnaires. You will also provide your 
perceptions about how easy or interesting material will be to learn, study passages, and take a 
test on the passages you studied.” Participants first filled out the NEO-FFI-3. They then began 
the experiment by accessing a computer program that navigated participants through the phases 
of the study. The experiment on the computer consisted of three phases: judgment of passages, 
studying of passages, and the multiple-choice test.  Participants completed the demographic 
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questionnaire and answered the questions regarding their beliefs about their intelligence in 
between studying the passages and taking the test as a distractor task. 
 Judgment Phase. Participants were first asked to read the titles and the first two lines of 
each passage, and based on this information rate each passage for ease of learning (EOL) and 
interest (JOI). JOI and EOL data were collected to replicate findings in Son and Metcalfe (2000) 
where there were high correlations between EOLs and JOIs, such that passages that were judged-
easy were also judged more interesting. Participants first rated each passage based on EOL (with 
1 = easiest and 8 = most difficult) and JOI (with 1 = most interesting and 8 = least interesting). 
Once participants rated the passages, they were then asked to rank the passages in terms of EOL 
and JOI in case any of the passages received the same rating. If participants did not give any 
passages the same rating, the computer program ranked the passages automatically based on their 
initial ratings. Participants’ initial ratings of EOL and JOI were collected in addition to their 
forced ranking of the passage in order to obtain initial perceptions of the passages and to see if 
their ranking deviated from their initial judgments. In sum, each participant had ratings of EOL 
and JOI for each passage, as well as the rank order of EOL and JOI for all eight passages.  
 Studying Phase. Prior to the study, participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: high-time pressure and low-time pressure. They were assigned unique identification 
numbers. Participants with odd identification numbers were in the high time pressure condition, 
and participants with even identification numbers were in the low time pressure condition. 
Participants in the high time pressure condition were allotted eight minutes to study the passages, 
and participants in the low time pressure condition were allotted 16 minutes to study all of the 
passages. Participants in the high time pressure condition received the following instructions:  
“You will now have the opportunity to read through and study the full passages for eight 
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minutes. You can always go back to one that you’ve read and studied already. Note taking is not 
allowed. There will be a test after the 8 minutes has ended, and it will be testing the material 
from all 8 passages.” Participants in the low time pressure condition received the following 
instructions: “You will now have the opportunity to read through and study the full passages for 
16 minutes. You can always go back to one that you’ve read and studied already. Note taking is 
not allowed. There will be a test after the 16 minutes has ended, and it will be testing the material 
from all 8 passages.” All eight passage titles were displayed in a circular array on the computer 
screen. Their position within the circular array was randomized. There was a clock displaying the 
remaining study time. Participants were able to select passages to study from the main menu in 
any order and at any time could return to the main menu to select a different passage. The 
computer program recorded each participant’s studying activities. The following data were 
captured: the total time studying, the cumulative time spent on each passage, which passages 
were read, the total number passages read, the order in which the passages were read, and the 
number of times participants viewed each passage. Once the allotted time ran out, participants 
were immediately taken to the demographics questionnaire. 
Test Phase. The participants received a 48-item, multiple choice test. The questions were 
grouped together by passage, but the order the participants’ answer to each of the passage’s 
questions was presented randomly on the computer screen. Three scores were recorded by the 
computer: total items correct, total memory items correct, and total inference items correct. 
Participants had unlimited time to answer the questions, however, the computer program 





Research Design  
 This study used an experimental design to explore and clarify the relationship between 
personality traits, implicit theories of intelligence, and metacognitive control over study time 
allocation and subsequent test performance. The experiment consisted of one between-subjects 
factors, which was time allotted to study the passages, or time pressure (High Time Pressure vs. 






















This study sought to explore and clarify the relationship between personality traits, 
motivational variables, and metacognitive control over study time allocation and subsequent test 
performance when faced with varying time pressure, in order to replicate the general study-time 
allocation findings from Son and Metcalfe (2000). In addition, this study investigated the 
following research questions: (1) Is there a relationship between any of the Five Factor 
personality traits and metacognitive strategy use? (2) Is there a relationship between any of the 
Five Factor personality traits and test performance? (3) Is there a relationship between implicit 
views of intelligence and metacognitive strategy use? (4) Is there a relationship between implicit 
views of intelligence and test performance? (5) Is there an association between the Five Factor 
personality traits and implicit views of intelligence?  
Based on previous research, it was hypothesized:  H1) Under high time pressure, 
participants will allocate more study-time to judged-easy passages, where under low time 
pressure, participants will not show a preference for study-time allocation, regardless of their 
personality traits and/or beliefs about intelligence; H2) Under high time pressure, participants 
who score high on Conscientiousness will use less effective metacognitive strategies (i.e., will 
not choose to allocate more study time to judged-easy passages) compared to participants who 
score low on Conscientiousness; H3) Under high time pressure, students who identify with an 
incremental theory of intelligence will use less effective metacognitive strategies (i.e., will not 
choose to allocate more study time to judged-easy passages) compared to participants who 
identify with an entity theory of intelligence; and H4) Participants who identify with an 
incremental theory of intelligence will also score high on Conscientiousness.  
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As previously stated, the dependent variables included test performance and 
metacognitive strategy use, which was determined by using Goodman-Kruskal Gamma 
correlations (G). Gamma correlations are nonparametric rank order correlations, and were 
computed to examine the relationship between participants’ metacognitive judgments (i.e., EOL 
and JOI rankings of passages) and metacognitive decisions while studying  (i.e., the amount of 
time allotted to each passage), as well as between metacognitive judgments (EOL) and test 
performance. Gamma correlations have been used in the majority of studies on metacognitive 
judgment accuracy. As argued by Nelson (1984), gamma correlations are the best available tool 
for metacognitive research, especially when there are ties in the data.  Multiple gamma 
correlations were computed. The first gamma correlations measured the total study time 
allocated to each of the eight passages as they related to each person’s 1) EOL judgment of each 
passage, and 2) JOI judgment of each passage. A positive correlation indicates participants 
allocated more study time to passages judged as difficult or not interesting, and a negative 
correlation indicates participants allocated more study time to passages judged as easy or 
interesting. Another gamma correlation between participants’ EOL and test performance was 
computed.  A negative gamma correlation indicates participants performed better on judged-easy 
passages, where a positive correlation indicates participants performed better on judged-difficult 
passages.  
 
Frequency of Personality Traits in the Sample 
Since many of the research questions pertained to participants’ self-reported personality 
traits, a closer examination of the frequency of each trait within the sample was conducted. 
Using the scoring criteria in the NEO-FFI-3 manual, participants’ self-reported raw scores across 
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the five personality domains were converted to standardized T-scores. The T-scores for each of 
the five domains were then used to determine a qualitative description, which ranged from “Very 
Low” to “Very High.” Based on these ranges, the qualitative description was recoded to a 
numerical variable from 1 to 5, with 1 being “Very Low,” 2 being “Low,” 3 being “Average,” 4 
being “High,” and 5 being “Very High,”. Participants who were considered low-to-average on 
Conscientiousness had ratings between 1 and 3, where participants who were considered high on 
Conscientiousness had ratings between 4 and 5. Of note, there was only a small number of 
participants who rated themselves as “Very High” on Conscientiousness (n =11) and 
Agreeableness (n = 6). No participants rated themselves as “Very Low” on Openness. 
Frequencies for each personality trait in the sample are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Personality Trait Frequencies in the Sample (n = 124)  
 Very Low Low Average High Very High 
Neuroticism  11 21 26 37 29 
Extraversion 13 19 41 29 22 
Conscientiousness 20 28 49 16 11 
Openness 0 8 25 42 49 
Agreeableness 25 25 45 23 6 
 
 
As previously discussed, participants’ initial ratings of EOLs and JOIs were collected in 
order to see if their ranking deviated from their initial rating of the passages. The rankings were 
positively and significantly correlated to initial ratings for both EOLs (Study Time: G = .83, p 
< .01; Test Performance: G = .83, p < .01) and JOIs (G = .84, p < .01), so only the rankings were 
reported in subsequent data analyses, unless they deviated from the initial ratings.  
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Table 2 contains the mean gamma correlations, standard deviations, and ranges by time 
pressure condition for the total sample. Table 3 contains the means, standard deviations, and 
ranges for test performance and predictor variables for the total sample. As a reminder, 
participants who have a mean greater than three identify with an incremental theory of 
intelligence. All variables met assumptions of normality so no transformations were performed. 
 
Table 2 
Mean Gamma Correlations by Time Pressure 
 High Time Pressure Low Time Pressure 
 Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
EOL and Study-Time (G) -.03 .32 -.73 to.79 .03 .31 -.71 to .57 
JOI and Study-Time (G) -.01 .34 -.91 to. 74 .01 .34 -.86 to 1.00  





Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges for Predictor and Outcome Variables by Time 
Pressure 
 High Time Pressure Low Time Pressure 
 Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Test Performance (% Correct) .65 .12 .35 to .88 .71 .15 .25 to.94  
Implicit Views of Intelligence* 4.14 1.18 1.67 to 6.00 3.94 1.25 1.00 to 6.00  
Neuroticism  3.26 1.29 1.00 to 5.00 3.58 1.22 1.00 to 5.00  
Extraversion 3.27 1.22 1.00 to 5.00 3.12 1.22 1.00 to 5.00  
Openness 4.05 .93 2.00 to 5.00 4.10 .93 2.00 to 5.00  
Agreeableness 2.92 1.11 1.00 to 5.00 2.44 1.13 1.00 to 5.00  
Conscientiousness  2.71 1.16 1.00 to 5.00 2.81 1.13 1.00 to 5.00  
* >3 indicates an incremental theory of intelligence 
 
Intercorrelations 
Intercorrelations among the independent and dependent variables within the total sample 
are presented in Table 4.  Time pressure was significantly correlated with Agreeableness (r = -
.21, p < .05) and test performance (r = .21, p < .05). Neuroticism was significantly correlated 
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with Extraversion (r = -.36, p < .01), Agreeableness (r = -.27, p < .01), and Conscientiousness (r 
= -.31, p < .01). Agreeableness was also significantly correlated with the gamma correlation for 
the relation between EOLs and study time allocation (r = -.22, p < .05). Openness was 
significantly correlated with test performance (r = .24, p < .01). Participant’s EOL judgments, 
were significantly correlated (gamma correlation) with overall test performance (r = .21, p 
< .05), which indicates that participants who performed better on judged-difficult passages also 
obtained higher test scores. 
 Both parametric (Pearson’s r) and non-parametric (G) correlations were computed and 
reported to examine the relationship between EOLs and JOIs since these variables involved 
rankings. EOLs were significantly related to JOIs, both for initial ratings (r = .42, p < .01; G 
= .30, p < .01) and rankings (r = .43, p < .01; G = .33, p < .01). This is consistent with previous 
findings (G = .25; Son & Metcalfe, 2000). 
The hypothesis that participants who identified with an incremental theory of intelligence 
will also score high on Conscientiousness was not confirmed. In contrast, participant’s implicit 
theories of intelligence was significantly correlated with Openness (r = .20, p < .05). The degree 
to which participants identified with an incremental theory of intelligence increased as a function 
















Intercorrelations Among the Independent and Dependent Variables 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Gamma EOL x Study-Time --           
2. Gamma JOI x Study-Time, .43** --          
3. Gamma EOL x Test -.05 -.08 --         
4. Time Pressure  .09 .03 .04 --        
5. Multiple Choice Test .11 < .01 .21* .21* --       
6. Implicit Views of Intel. -.08 -.13 -.05 -.09 .03 --      
7. Neuroticism  .06 .01 -.04 .13 -.07 <.01 --     
8. Extraversion .06 <.01 .08 -.04 -.15 .10 -.36** --    
9. Openness -.07 -.12 -.12 .02 .24** .20* -.14 .02 --   
10. Agreeableness -.22* -.08 .04 -.21* .07 .05 -.27** .06 .02 --  




Intercorrelations among the demographic variables and the independent and dependent 
variables were also explored. There were significant correlations between age and beliefs about 
intelligence (r = .23, p < .01), which indicates that as participants’ age increased, they were more 
likely to identify with an incremental theory of intelligence.  Additionally, year in school and 
Openness was significantly correlated, (r = .29, p < .01), as was declared psychology majors and 
time pressure (r = .21, p < .05). Lastly, GPA was positively correlated with test performance (r 
= .19, p < .05). Of note, reported SAT scores, which are thought to be correlated to cognitive 
ability (Frey & Determan, 2004), were not significantly related to any of the independent of 
dependent variables.  
 
Univariate Tests Independent of Personality and Implicit Theories of Intelligence 
 A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the means between the high time 
pressure and low time pressure conditions for overall test performance, performance on memory 
items, performance on inference items, and metacognitive strategy-use. The univariate test was 
run without the personality and implicit views of intelligence variables to examine whether 
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findings were consistent with Son and Metcalfe (2000). The purpose of these analyses was also 
test the hypothesis that when faced with high time pressure, participants would allocate more 
study-time to judged-easy passages, but when faced with low time pressure, participants would 
not show a preference for study-time allocation. Results of the univariate ANOVA for test 
performance as a function of time pressure are presented in Table 5.  Results from the univariate 
ANOVA for the relation between metacognitive judgments and study time allocation are 




Univariate ANOVAs Comparing Test Performance Between High Time Pressure and Low Time 
Pressure  




Univariate ANOVAs Comparing Metacognitive Judgments and Study-Time (Gamma 
Correlations) Between High Time Pressure and Low Time Pressure  
*p < .05 
 
Test Performance. The mean proportion correct on the multiple choice test for the high 
time pressure group was significantly lower than the mean proportion correct for the low time 





 Mean SD Mean SD F-value p-value 
% Total Correct  .65 .12 .71 .15 5.46 .02* 
% Memory Items Correct .67 .12 .73 .17 5.93 .02* 
% Inference Items Correct .60 .17 .65 1.22 2.84 .10 





 Mean SD Mean SD F-value p-value 
EOL and Study-Time (G) -.03 .32 .03 .31 .97 .33 
JOI and Study-Time (G) -.01 .34 .01 .34 .11 .75 
EOL and Test Perform. (G) -.06 .40 -.02 .44 .21 .65 
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pressure group, F(1, 122) = 5.46, p < .05.  These findings are consistent with Son and Metcalfe 
(2000).  Further, the mean proportion of both memory and inference items correct on the test for 
the high time pressure group was lower than the low time pressure group, but only the difference 
between memory items reached significance, F(1, 122) = 5.93, p < .05.  Overall, participants 
performed better on memory items (M = .70) than inferences items (M = .62).  
 Additionally, a gamma correlation between participants’ EOL and test performance was 
computed.  As previously stated, a negative gamma correlation indicates participants performed 
better on judged-easy passages, where a positive correlation indicates participants performed 
better on judged-difficult passages. The mean gamma correlation for participants in the high time 
pressure condition was -.06 and the mean gamma correlation for participants in the low time 
pressure condition was -.02. The difference between the conditions did not reach statistical 
significance, F(1,120) = .21, p = .65), and the gamma correlations were not significantly 
different than zero. These results indicate that participants EOL judgments were not related to 
their test performance.  
Metacognitive Judgments and Study-Time Allocation. Gamma correlations in these 
analyses measured the total study time allocated to each of the eight passages as they related to 
each person’s EOL and JOI of each passage. As stated earlier, a positive correlation indicates 
participants allocated more study time to judged-difficult or judged-boring passages, and a 
negative correlation indicates participants allocated more study time to judged-easy or interesting 
passages.  
The mean gamma correlations between EOL and study time for participants in the high 
time pressure condition and low time pressure condition were -.03 and .03, respectively. Neither 
correlation was significantly different than zero (high time pressure: t(60) = -.71, p = .48; low 
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time pressure: t(61) = .68, p = .50). The mean gamma correlations between JOI and study time 
for participants in the high time pressure condition and low time pressure condition were -.01 
and .01, respectively. Neither correlation was significantly different than zero (high time 
pressure: t(60) = -.12, p = .91; low time pressure: t(61) = .34 p = .73).The difference between the 
high time pressure condition and the low time pressure condition did not reach statistical 
significance either for the relationship between EOL judgments and study time, F(1,122) = 0.97, 
p = .33) or the relationship between JOI judgments and study time, F(1,122) = 0.11, p = .75. 
Further, since the gamma correlations for both groups were not significantly greater than zero, 
this suggests that participants did not show a preference for study-time allocation in this study 
with regard to how interesting or difficult they found the material regardless of time pressure. 
While this partly confirms the hypothesis that people faced with low time pressure would not 
show a preference for study-time allocation, participants did not show a preference for study-
time allocation regardless of time pressure.  
 The order in which participants studied the passages was also examined, since it is 
possible participants chose to study certain passages earlier based on EOL or JOI judgments. 
Previous studies have found that participants chose to study easier materials first (Son & 
Metcalfe, 2000; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999). Another set of gamma correlations were computed 
between participants’ EOLs and the order they studied the passages, as well as between 
participants’ JOIs and the order they studied the passages. A positive gamma correlation 
indicates that participants chose to study passages ranked as easy or interesting first, and a 
negative correlation indicates participants chose to study passages ranked as difficult or less 
interesting first.  
Upon inspecting the data, 68 participants studied the passages in the order they appeared 
44 
 
on their computer screen as opposed to using their EOLs or JOIs. Whether or not participants 
studied the passages in the order they appeared was not significantly correlated to any of the 
independent or dependent variables. However, when these 68 participants were removed from 
analyses, while the difference between the high time pressure condition and low time pressure 
was not significant (EOL: F(1, 53) = .09, p > .05; JOI: F(1, 53) = .23, p > .05), the mean gamma 
correlation between EOL and JOI judgments and passage study order was significantly greater 
than zero for both EOLs, G = .21, t(54) = 4.12, p < .01, and JOIs, G = .23, t(54) = 4.33 p <.01. 
This means that participants who used their metacognitive judgments chose to study judged-easy 
and judged-interesting passages first, regardless of time pressure, which confirms previous 
findings (Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999). Given the number of participants 
that did not use their metacognitive judgments to make decisions about the order they studied the 
passages, this set of gamma correlations was not included in the main analyses.   
In general, participants did not allocate study-time on the basis of EOLs and thus the 
finding that participants would allocate more study-time to judged-easy material was not 
replicated. Follow-up analyses were conducted to further explore any other trends. Firstly, it is 
possible that the passages did not vary enough in difficulty or interest for participants to behave 
systematically. To evaluate this, frequency of initial ratings of passages on the basis of both 
EOLs and JOIs were examined. As a reminder, participants first rated each passage based on 
EOL (with 1 = easiest and 8 = most difficult) and then on JOI (with 1 = most interesting and 8 = 
least interesting).  Initial JOIs were evenly distributed, indicating adequate variability. In 
contrast, for initial EOLs, most passages were rated between a 1 and 5. This indicates that the 
passages were not initially perceived as very difficult.  
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To examine whether participants who did initially judge the material as varying in 
difficulty had a preference for study-time allocation, participants who did not initially judge 
passages as difficult or very difficult (i.e., did not rate any passages as a 7 or 8) were removed 
from the analysis. There were 70 participants who perceived at least one passage as difficult or 
very difficult (i.e., did rate a passage as a 7 or 8). The difference in mean gamma correlations 
between EOLs and study-time for these participants in the high time pressure and low time 
pressure condition approached significance, F(1, 69) = 3.12, p = .08, indicating a trend consistent 
with the findings in Son and Metcalfe (2000). They were more likely to allocate study-time to 
judged-easy passages when faced with time pressure. While the gamma correlation was not 
significantly greater than zero, G =  -.11, t(34) = -1.88,  p  = .06, it also approached significance. 
In contrast, participants in the low time pressure condition did not show a preference for study-
time allocation, G =  .03, t(35) = .54,  p  > .05. This indicates that participants who judged at 
least one passage as difficult did in fact use metacognitive judgments to allocate study-time to a 
greater degree than participants who did not.  
Additionally, an extreme group analysis of the Gamma correlations between 
metacognitive judgments and study-time allocation was conducted by eliminating participants 
whose Gamma correlations were close to zero (n = 25). The cutoff points used were -0.2 and 0.2. 
These were selected as cutoff points because values smaller than that are relatively close to zero, 
which indicates no preference for study time. The results indicated no significant differences 
between participants in the high time pressure condition and participants in the low time pressure 
condition with regard to study-time allocation on the basis of metacognitive judgments (EOLs 
and JOIs). See Table 19 in Appendix B for results from the univariate ANOVA from these 
analyses. Lastly, a median split was performed using zero as a cutoff point and a Pearson Chi-
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Square analysis was conducted to see if there were any differences between participants who 
allocated study-time to judged-easy items and participants who allocated study-time to judged-
difficult items on the basis on time pressure, as well as to participants who allocated study-time 
to judged-interesting items to participants who allocated study-time to judged-boring items. 
Neither Chi-Square test was significant, EOL: Pearson Chi-Square (1, 123) = .07, p > .05; JOI: 
Pearson Chi-Square (1, 123), = .23, p > .05.  
 
Univariate Tests with Personality Traits and Implicit Theories of Intelligence 
Conscientiousness, Metacognitive Judgments and Study-Time Allocation. It was 
hypothesized that participants who scored high on Conscientiousness would use less effective 
metacognitive strategies compared to participants who rated themselves low on 
Conscientiousness when faced with time pressure. The variable Conscientiousness was 
transformed to distinguish participants who rated themselves high on Conscientiousness from 
participants who rated themselves average or low on Conscientiousness. Based on the qualitative 
descriptions provided in the NEO-FFI-3 manual, the qualitative description was recoded to a 
numerical variable from 1 to 5, with 1 being “Very Low,” 2 being “Low,” 3 being “Average,” 4 
being “High,” and 5 being “Very High,” Participants who were considered low-to-average on 
Conscientiousness had ratings between 1 and 3, where participants who were considered high on 
Conscientiousness had ratings between 4 and 5. 
To test this hypothesis, a two-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the means 
between the time pressure condition (high vs. low), Conscientiousness (high vs. low-to-average), 
and their interaction (Conscientiousness* Condition) for metacognitive strategy-use, or gamma 
correlations (G) between EOL judgments and study time and JOI judgments and study-time.  
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The ANOVA indicated a significant difference between participants high on Conscientiousness 
and participants low-to-average on Conscientiousness for the gamma correlation between JOIs 
and study-time (gamma correlation), F(3, 119) =  3.95, p < .05. Participants high on 
Conscientiousness were more likely to allocate study-time to judged-interesting material 
compared to participants who were low-to-average on Conscientiousness. This finding, coupled 
with an insignificant interaction between Conscientiousness and time pressure, does not confirm 
the hypothesis that participants who rated themselves high on Conscientiousness would use 
ineffective metacognitive strategies compared to participants who rated themselves low on 
Conscientiousness. The results from the univariate ANOVA analysis are presented in Table 7. 
Further interpretation of the gamma correlations is provided below. 
 
Table 7 
Univariate ANOVAs Comparing Metacognitive Judgments and Study-Time (Gamma 







*p < .05 
 
The mean gamma correlations between EOLs and study-time allocation and JOIs and 
study-time allocation for participants who rated themselves high on Conscientiousness were not 
statistically significant from zero. This was true for participants in the high time pressure 
condition (EOL: G = -.02, t(12) = -.15, p = .89; JOI: G = -.09, t(12) = -.65, p =.53) and the low 
time pressure condition (EOL: G = -.13, t(13) = -1.86, p = .09; JOI: G = -.14, t(13) = -1.53 p 
=.15). Similarly, the gamma correlations for participants who rated themselves low-to-average 
 EOLs JOIs 
 F-value p-value F-value p-value 
Time Pressure  .00 .97 .01 .93 
Conscientiousness 1.82 .18 3.94 .05* 
Time Pressure*Conscientiousness 2.47 .12 .47 .50 
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on Conscientiousness were not significant, both when faced with high time pressure (EOL: G = -
.03, t(47) = -.77, p = .45; JOI: G = .02, t(47) = .34, p =.73) and low time pressure (EOL: G = .07, 
t(47) = 1.60, p = .12; JOI: G =.06, t(47) = 1.23, p = .23). The overall gamma correlations were 
also not significantly different from zero independent of time pressure for participants high on 
Conscientiousness (EOL: G = .02, t(95) = .63, p = .53; JOI: G =.04, t(95) = 1.14, p = .26) or 
participants low-to-average on Conscientiousness (EOL: G = .02, t(95) = .63, p = .53; JOI: G 
=.04, t(95) = 1.14, p = .26). Overall, these gamma correlations indicate that participants did not 
show a strong preference for study-time allocation based on their metacognitive judgments 
regardless of time pressure or degree of Conscientiousness. Table 8 contains the means of the 




Mean Gamma Correlation (G) for Conscientiousness by Time Pressure Condition 
*Participants high on Conscientiousness had average ratings >3 
**Participants low on Conscientiousness had average ratings ≤ 3 
 
Again, many participants did not initially judge the material as varying in difficulty (n = 
54). An additional two-way ANOVA using the same independent variables above was conducted 
to investigate the relationship between EOL and study-time allocation, excluding those 
participants who did not initially judge any passages as difficult. The ANOVA test was not 
significant and none of the gammas were significantly different than zero. However, the mean 
gamma correlations across time conditions suggest that participants high on Conscientiousness 
 High Time Pressure Low Time Pressure Total 
 High C* 
(n = 13) 
Low C.**  
(n = 48) 
High C.* 
(n = 14) 
Low C.** 
(n = 48) 
High C.* 
(n = 27) 
Low C.** 
(n = 96) 
EOL and Study-Time (G) -.02 -.03 -.13 .07 -.07 .02 
JOI and Study-Time (G) -.09 .02 -.14 .06 -.11 .04 
49 
 
were allocating study-time to judged-easy passages to some degree. This is contrary to the 
hypothesis that participants high on Conscientiousness would use ineffective metacognitive 
strategies when faced with time pressure. The results from the ANOVA analysis are presented in 
Table 9. Table 10 contains the means of the gamma correlations (G) separated by condition and 
degree of Conscientiousness.  
 
Table 9 
Univariate ANOVAs Comparing EOLs and Study-Time (Gamma Correlations) Between Time 







*p < .05 










*Participants high on Conscientiousness had average ratings >3 
**Participants low on Conscientiousness had average ratings ≤ 3 
1Excluding participants with no initial EOL ratings ≥ 7 
 
 
Conscientiousness and Test Performance. A two-way ANOVA was conducted to 
compare the means between time pressure, degrees of Conscientiousness, and their interaction 
across overall test performance. As previously confirmed, the participants in the low time 
pressure condition obtained higher test scores than participants in the high time pressure 
condition, F(3, 120) = 4.01, p < .05. However, results indicated that neither the degree of 
 EOLs 
 F-value p-value 
Time Pressure  .71 .40 
Conscientiousness 1.25 .27 
Time Pressure*Conscientiousness .63 .43 
 High Time Pressure Low Time Pressure Total 
 High C* 
(n = 8) 
Low C.**  
(n = 27) 
High C.* 
(n = 6) 
Low C.** 
(n = 30) 
High C.* 
(n = 14) 
Low C.** 
(n = 57) 
EOL and Study-Time (G) -.14 -.10 -.13 .06 -.14 -.02 
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Conscientiousness nor the interaction between Conscientiousness and time pressure impacted 
test performance. Table 11 contains the results from the ANOVA, and Table 12 contains the 
mean test performance as function of time pressure and Conscientiousness.  
 
Table 11 

















*Participants high on Conscientiousness had average ratings >3 
**Participants low on Conscientiousness had average ratings ≤ 3 
 
 
Implicit Theories of Intelligence, Metacognitive Judgments and Study-Time 
Allocation. It was also hypothesized that participants who identified with an incremental theory 
of intelligence would use less effective metacognitive strategies than participants who identified 
with an entity theory of intelligence when faced with high time pressure. The measure of implicit 
theories of intelligence was transformed to distinguish participants who identified with an 
incremental theory of intelligence from participants who identified with an entity theory of 
intelligence or who did not strongly identify with either theory. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, participants rated statements that depicted entity theories of intelligence on a scale of 1-
6 based on their degree of agreement with each statement (with 1 = Strongly Agree and 6 = 
 F-value p-value 
Time Pressure  4.01 .04* 
Conscientiousness .01 .91 
Time Pressure*Conscientiousness .03 .87 
 High Time Pressure Low Time Pressure Total 
 High C* 
(n = 13) 
Low C.**  
(n = 48) 
High C.* 
(n = 14) 
Low C.** 
(n = 48) 
High C.* 
(n = 27) 
Low C.** 
(n = 96) 
% Total Correct .65 .65 .71 .70 .68 .68 
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Strongly Disagree). The score was averaged, and an average score less than equal to 3 was 
classified as having an entity theory of intelligence, where a score greater than or equal to 4 was 
classified as having an incremental theory of intelligence. Participants who scored between a 
three and four did not indicate a clear theory.  
To test this hypothesis, a two-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the means 
between time pressure condition (high vs. low), implicit theories of intelligence (incremental vs. 
entity), and their interaction (Implicit Theory of Intelligence* Condition) for metacognitive 
strategy-use (gamma correlations (G) between EOL judgments and study time and JOI 
judgments and study-time). For the first ANOVA, participants who did not strongly identify with 
either theory were excluded from this analysis (n = 32). The ANOVA was not significant, which 
indicates that there were no significant differences between participants who strongly identified 
with an incremental theory of intelligence and participants who strongly identified with an entity 
theory of intelligence for metacognitive strategy-use. Table 13 contains the results from the 
ANOVA. 
A second ANOVA was conducted including participants who did not strongly identify 
with either theory. Specifically, participants who had an average score of less than or equal to 
three were in one group (entity theory of intelligence), and participants who had a score greater 
than three were in another group (incremental theory of intelligence). With the exception of the 
inclusion of those participants, the independent and dependent variables were the same as those 
in the first ANOVA. Results from the ANOVA indicate a significant interaction between implicit 
theories of intelligence and time pressure condition for the gamma correlation between JOIs and 
study-time, F(3, 119) = 3.93, p < .05.  Under high time pressure, participants who identified with 
an incremental theory of intelligence were more likely to allocate study-time to judged-
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interesting passages compared to participants who did not identify with an incremental theory of 
intelligence (i.e., identified with an entity theory or no theory), who were more likely to allocate 
more study-time to judged-boring passages. See Figure 1 for a graph of the interaction.  
This finding was apparent only when participants who did not identify with a clear theory 
were included in the analysis. Overall, this finding did not confirm the hypothesis that 
participants who identify with an incremental theory of intelligence would use ineffective 
metacognitive strategies compared to participants who identify with an entity theory of 
intelligence.  The results from the univariate ANOVA analysis are presented in Table 13. Further 
interpretation of the gamma correlations is also discussed below.  
 
Table 13 
Univariate ANOVAs Comparing Metacognitive Judgments and Study-Time (Gamma 
Correlations) Between Time Pressure and Implicit Theories of Intelligence 









 Excluding Non-Theory P’s 
(n= 92)  
Including Non-Theory P’s 
(n = 124) 
 EOLs JOIs EOLs JOIs 
 F-value p-value F-value p-value     F-value p-value 
Time Pressure  .00 .97 .01 .93 .08 .78 
Implicit Theories of Intel. 1.82 .18 3.94 .05 1.33 .25 
Time Pressure*Intel. 2.47 .12 .47 .05* 1.16 .29 
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The mean gamma correlations for participants who identified with an incremental theory 
of intelligence were not statistically significant from zero, both in the high time pressure 
condition (EOL: G = -.04, t(37) = -.83, p = .41; JOI: G = -.08, t(37) = -1.49, p =.15), and the low 
time pressure condition (EOL: G = .00, t(32) = -.01, p = .93; JOI: G = .01, t(32) = .16, p =.87). 
Similarly, the mean gamma correlations for participants with an entity theory of intelligence 
were not statistically significant, both in the high time pressure condition (EOL: G = .10, t(8) 
= .93, p = .38; JOI: G = .12, t(8) = .88, p =.40) and low time pressure condition (EOL: G = .07, 
t(9) = .87, p = .40; JOI: G = -.01, t(9) = -.05, p =.96).  The mean gamma correlations were also 
not significantly different from zero for participants who did not clearly identify with a theory of 
intelligence, both in the high time pressure condition (EOL: G = -.08, t(13) = -.76, p = .46; JOI: 
G = .11, t(13) = -1.15, p =.27), and the low time pressure condition (EOL: G = .06, t(17) = .62, p 
= .54; JOI: G = .04, t(17) = .48, p =.67). Lastly, the gamma correlations were not significantly 
different from zero independent of time pressure for participants with an incremental theory of 
intelligence (EOL: G = -.02, t(70) = -.69, p = .49; JOI: G = -.04, t(70) = -.99, p =.32), an entity 
theory of intelligence (EOL: G = .03, t(36) = .48, p = .63; JOI: G = .05, t(36) = .83, p =.41), and 
no clear theory of intelligence (EOL: G = .00, t(32) = -.03, p = .97; JOI: G = .07, t(32) = 1.14, p 
=.26). Despite mean level differences between varying implicit theories of intelligence, these 
gamma correlations indicate that participants did not show a strong preference for study-time 
allocation based on their EOLs or their JOIs regardless of time pressure or their implicit theory 
of intelligence.  Table 14 contains the means of the gamma correlations (G) for implicit theories 









Mean Gamma Correlations (G) for Implicit Theories of Intelligence by Condition 
1Participants who identify with an Incremental theory of intelligence had scores ≥ 4 
2Participants who identify with an Entity theory of intelligence had scores < 3 
3Participants who do not clearly identify with either theory had score between 3 and 4 
 
Another two-way ANOVA using the same variables above was conducted excluding 
those participants who did not initially judge any passages as difficult (n = 54), as well as those 
participants who did not clearly identify with either implicit theory of intelligence (n = 32), 
which resulted in 42 remaining participants. The ANOVA indicated a significant difference 
between participants who identified with an incremental theory of intelligence and participants 
who identified with a entity theory of intelligence for the study-time allocation on the basis of 
EOLs (gamma correlation), F(3, 38) =  7.00, p < .05. Participants who identified with an 
incremental theory of intelligence were more likely to allocate study-time to judged-easy 
passages, where participants who identified with an entity theory of intelligence were more likely 
to allocate study-time to judged-difficult passages. Though none of the gamma correlations were 
significantly different from zero, closer examination of the mean gamma correlations indicates 
that participants who identified with an incremental theory of intelligence allocated study-time to 
judged-easy passages to a stronger degree under high time pressure. This is contrary to the 
hypothesis that participants with an incremental theory of intelligence would implement 
ineffective metacognitive strategies. The results from the ANOVA analysis are presented in 





















-.04 .10 -.08 .00 .07 .06 -.02 .08 -.04 
JOI and Study-
Time (G) 
-.08 .12 .10 .01 -.01 .04 -.04 .05 -.08 
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Table 15. Table 16 contains the means of the gamma correlations (G) separated by condition and 
degree of Conscientiousness.  
 
Table 15 
Univariate ANOVAs Comparing EOL Judgments and Study-Time (Gamma Correlations) 








*p < .05 
1Excluding participants with no initial EOL ratings ≥ 7 
 
Table 16 
Mean Gamma Correlations (G) for Implicit Theories of Intelligence by Condition1 
*Participants who identify with an Incremental theory of intelligence had scores ≥ 4 
**Participants who identify with an Entity theory of intelligence had scores < 3 
1Excluding participants with no initial EOL ratings ≥ 7 
 
 
Implicit Theories of Intelligence and Test Performance.  A two-way ANOVA was 
conducted to compare the means between time pressure, implicit theories of intelligence, and 
their interaction across overall test performance. The first ANOVA was conducted excluding 
participants who did not identify strongly with either theory, and the second ANOVA test was 
conducted including these participants. Neither test was significant, indicating that neither 
implicit theories of intelligence nor the interaction between implicit theories of intelligence and 
time pressure impacted test performance. Additionally, in these ANOVAs there were no 
significant differences as a function of time pressure. Table 17 contains the results from both 
 Excluding Non-Theory P’s 
(n= 92)  
 F-value     p-value 
Time Pressure  .63 .43 
Implicit Theories of Intel. 7.00 .01* 
Time Pressure*Intel. 1.02 .32 















EOL and Study-Time (G) -.19 .20 .00 .18 -.10 .19  
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ANOVA tests, and Table 18 contains the mean test performance as function of time pressure and 




Univariate ANOVAs Comparing Mean Test Performance between Time Pressure and Implicit 








*p < .05 
 
Table 18 
Mean Test Performance for Implicit Theories of Intelligence by Condition 
1Participants who identify with an Incremental theory of intelligence had scores ≥ 4 
2Participants who identify with an Entity theory of intelligence had scores < 3 
3Participants who do not clearly identify with either theory had score between 3 and 4 
 
 
Multiple Regression Analyses 
Personality Traits, Beliefs About Intelligence, and Study-Time Allocation. 
Regression analyses using the enter method were used to determine if any of the Five Factor 
personality traits or people’s implicit theories of intelligence contributed significantly to 
metacognitive strategy use. Both the Five Factor personality traits and implicit theories of 
intelligence were treated as continuous variables in the regression analyses.  
Interactions were also explored. The interaction between Conscientiousness and time 
pressure, as well as the interaction between implicit theories of intelligence and time pressure, 
 Excluding Non-Theory P’s 
(n= 92)  
Including Non-Theory P’s 
(n = 124) 
 F-value p-value F-value p-value 
Time Pressure  .27 .61 2.01 .15 
Implicit Theories of Intel. 1.19 .28 .10 .75 
Time Pressure*Intel. 1.39 .24 3.19 .08 



















% Total Correct .64 .65 .66 .72 .63 .72 .68 .64 .70 
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were examined. These variables were selected because there is research to support their 
relationship to metacognitive strategy use. The gamma correlation between EOLs and study-time 
was regressed on the interaction between Conscientiousness and time pressure and the 
interaction between implicit theories of intelligence and time pressure.  Additionally, the gamma 
correlation between JOIs and study-time was regressed on the interaction between 
Conscientiousness and time pressure and the interaction between implicit theories of intelligence 
and time pressure. None of the interactions were significant so they were not included in 
subsequent models. 
In the first regression analysis, the gamma correlation between EOLs and study-time was 
regressed on the five personality traits, participants’ implicit intelligence, and time pressure (R 
=.26, R2 = .07, R2adjusted = .01, F(7,115) = 1.11, p = .35. In the second regression analysis, the 
gamma correlation between JOIs and study-time allocation was regressed on the five personality 
traits, participants’ beliefs about intelligence, and time pressure condition (R =.21, R2 = .04, 
R2adjusted = -.01, F(7,115) = .74, p = .64). Tolerance and variance inflation factor values were 
within acceptable limits. The regression models were not significant, indicating that none of the 
dependent variables significantly predicted the relationship between metacognitive judgments 










*p < .05 
 
 R R Square  Adjusted R F 
Model 1: EOLs and Study-Time (G) .26 .07 .01 1.14 













*p < .05 
 
Personality Traits, Beliefs About Intelligence, and Test Performance. Regression 
analyses using the enter method were used to determine if any of the Five Factor personality 
traits or people’s implicit theories of intelligence contributed significantly to test performance. 
Test performance was also regressed on the interactions between time pressure condition and 
Conscientiousness and implicit views of intelligence, as these were the primary variables of 
interest. The interactions were not significant so they were included in the model.  
Participants’ total scores (% correct) on the multiple choice test were regressed on the 
five personality traits, participants’ implicit theories of intelligence, and time pressure. Tolerance 
and variance inflation factor values were within acceptable limits.  The regression equation was 
significant, R = .39, R2 = .15, R2adjusted = .10, F(7,115) = 2.89, p < .01.  The model accounted for 
15% of the variance in the data. Openness (β = .22, p < .01), Extraversion (β = -.21, p < .05), and 
time pressure (β = .23, p < .01) were significant predictors of test performance. Participants who 
were high on Openness obtained higher test scores on the multiple choice test, and participants 
who were high on Extraversion obtained lower test scores. Additionally, participants in the low 
 EOLs and Study-Time (G) JOIs and Study-Time (G) 
 B SE B β VIF B SE B β VIF 
Time Pressure  .03 .06 .05 1.01 .01 .07 .02 1.07 
Implicit Theories of Intel. -.02 .03 -.07 1.07 -.03 .03 -.10 1.07 
Neuroticism .01 .03 .04 1.50 -.02 .03 -.08 1.50 
Extraversion .03 .03 .10 1.19 -.00 .03 -.01 1.19 
Openness -.02 .03 -.05 1.10 -.04 .04 -.12 1.10 
Agreeableness -.06 .03 -.20 1.15 -.03 .03 -.09 1.15 
Conscientiousness .01 .03 .04 1.18 -.04 .03 -.13 1.18 
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time pressure condition obtained higher test scores. See tables 21 and 22 for the summaries of 
the regression analyses. 
 
Table 21 































 R R Square  Adjusted R F 
Model 1 (Test Performance) .39 .15 .10 2.89** 
 B SE B β VIF 
Time Pressure  .06 .02 .23** 1.07 
Implicit Theories of Intel. .00 .01 .04 1.07 
Neuroticism -.01 .01 -.12 1.47 
Extraversion -.02 .01 -.21* 1.19 
Openness .03 .01 .22** 1.10 
Agreeableness .01 .01 .09 1.13 





  Effective monitoring and control over one’s own thinking, or effective metacognition, is 
a central component to many cognitive tasks (Metcalfe, 1993; Paul, 1992; Reder, 1987; Reder & 
Ritter, 1992; Schneider & Lockl, 2002; Simon & Newell, 1971; Willingham, 2007) and thus is 
essential to optimize learning. Previous studies have used a study-time allocation paradigm to 
demonstrate that under realistic learning conditions, people allocate more time to easy-items they 
do not know, followed by difficult items, and do not study items they already know, which 
support a Region of Proximal Learning Model (Ariel, Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009; Kornell & 
Metcalfe, 2006, Metcalfe, 2002; Metcalfe, 2009; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2003; Son, 2004). Son and 
Metcalfe (2000) identified conditions that impact these study strategies, including time 
constraints, length of materials, and expectation of a test. Although research suggests that people 
have the capacity to use their metacognitive judgments strategically, many factors impact how 
strategies are implemented. What affective variables, such as personality traits or beliefs about 
intelligence, contribute to a person’s ability to succeed in learning situations where a person must 
be efficient with their time?  
This dissertation sought to explore and clarify the relationship between the Five Factor 
personality traits, implicit theories of intelligence, and metacognitive control over study-time 
allocation and subsequent test performance. In order to build on previous findings and reflect 
realistic studying conditions, this dissertation used the study-time allocation paradigm similar to 
the design used in the Son and Metcalfe study.  Participants first ranked passages based on 
difficulty (EOLs) and interest (JOIs), then studied the passages under either high or low time 
pressure, and, lastly, were tested on their understanding of the material. Participants also 
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completed a self-report measure of personality, as well as a measure of their beliefs about their 
intelligence. The dependent variables were the relationship between participants’ metacognitive 
judgments (EOLs and JOIs) and study-time allocation and test performance. Participants’ interest 
is important because it potentially impacts their views as to whether they believe the information 
is useful and/or relevant. The independent variables were each of the five personality traits 
contained in the Five Factor model, participants’ beliefs about their intelligence, and time 
pressure. A discussion of the results are provided below, followed by implications, directions for 
future research, and limitations of the current study.  
 
Time Pressure, Study-Time Allocation, and Test Performance 
 The first aim of this dissertation was to replicate the findings in the Son and Metcalfe 
(2000) study. Based on these findings, it was hypothesized that under high time pressure, 
participants would allocate more study-time to judged-easy passages, and under low time 
pressure, participants would not show a preference for study-time allocation on the basis of 
metacognitive judgments. Participants’ mean gamma correlations between EOLs and study-time 
and between JOIs and study-time were close to zero across both time pressure conditions. This 
indicates that participants did not use their metacognitive judgments to make decisions about 
study-time allocation when faced with high time pressure, which failed to replicate the results 
from Son and Metcalfe, as well as previous studies that support the Region of Proximal Learning 
model (Ariel, Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009; Kornell & Metcalfe, 2006, Metcalfe, 2002; Metcalfe, 
2009; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2003; Son, 2004). Although participants also did not show a 
preference for study-time allocation when faced with less time pressure, as was hypothesized and 
which is consistent with previous findings, this finding holds less significance because 
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participants who were faced with time pressure also did not show a preference for study-time 
allocation. It is of note that this study did replicate the finding that participants JOIs were 
significantly correlated with participants’ EOLs, such that passages they perceived as easier were 
also perceived as interesting. 
However, upon closer inspection of the data, it was determined one reason that 
contributed to participants’ lack of preference with regard to study-time allocation was that the 
passages did not vary enough in difficulty for participants to behave systematically. Once this 
was taken into account and analyses only included participants who did perceive variability in 
difficulty based on their initial ratings of the how easy the material would be to learn, the 
expected trend was observed. Participants allocated more study-time to passages judged as easy 
when faced with time constraints. Though results were only approaching significance, the effect 
was much stronger than when analyses excluded participants who did not judge any of the 
passages initially as difficult, which replicates the findings in the Son and Metcalfe (2000) study.  
Though the experiment aimed to create a realistic studying and testing conditions, there 
are limitations to how experiment conditions generalize to actual studying and testing conditions. 
Therefore, it is also possible that participants did not have enough investment in performing well 
on the multiple-choice test to put forth adequate effort. Basically, they may not have cared how 
they did on the test, so they did not study in a strategic manner. This notion is supported by the 
finding that more than half of participants (n = 68) chose to study the passages in the order they 
appeared on their computer screen, as opposed to using their judgments to choose which items to 
study first. Though results indicated that when those participants were removed from the 
analysis, participants did choose to study judged-easy and judged-interesting items first, which is 
consistent with previous findings (Dunlosky & Thiede, 1999: Son & Metacalfe, 2000), their 
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preference to study judged-easy and judged-interesting items first did not vary as a function of 
time pressure. It is possible these participants were not behaving strategically in order to improve 
test performance, rather, were making these decisions while studying as a means to make the 
experiment more enjoyable by choosing material that was not overly difficult or boring. 
Additionally, it is possible that participants in the high time pressure condition did not 
experience enough of a time constraint to be forced to make metacognitive decisions while 
studying. Which, coupled with a general perception that the overall material was not difficult to 
learn, they did not use their EOL and JOI judgments because they may have felt they had enough 
time to study all of the passages and they did not have to be strategic. 
While it is possible that there was not enough of a perceived time constraint in the high 
time pressure condition to influence metacognitive strategy use, the discrepancy between the 
time allotted across conditions was enough to impact test performance. Participants who had 
more time to study the passages performed better on the multiple-choice test than participants 
who had less time to study the passages, which is a logical finding and is consistent with findings 
in the Son and Metcalfe (2000) study. Participants in the low time pressure condition performed 
better both on memory items, or items based on information explicitly in the passages, and 
inference items, or items that require inferences or background knowledge to answer. However, 
the difference between time pressure conditions only approached significance for performance 







Personality Traits and Study-Time Allocation 
Characteristics that describe Conscientiousness include careful, rule-following, reliable, 
and hardworking. Conscientiousness is the personality trait most consistently associated with 
better study skills, higher academic achievement, and test performance (Chamorro-Premuzic & 
Furnham, 2003b; Conrad, 2006; Furnham & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2004; Graziano & Ward, 
1992; Noftle & Robins, 2007; Porporat, 2009). However, there might be a negative relationship 
between effective metacognitive strategies and Conscientiousness under certain circumstances. 
There is speculation that Conscientiousness serves as a compensatory mechanism for average 
intelligence, in that individuals who are high on Conscientiousness are high achievers despite 
average cognitive abilities (Moutafi, Furnham, & Crump, 2003; Chamorro-Premuzic & 
Furnham, 2004; Wood & Englert, 2009). As such, it is possible that Conscientiousness is also 
compensatory for higher order cognitive skills, such as metacognition and a person’s ability to 
make judgments about their own learning. Cucina and Vasilopulos (2005) found that very high 
levels of Conscientiousness were associated with lower grades because high conscientious 
individuals may take on too much at once or attempt to complete all assigned tasks, rather setting 
goals and prioritizing tasks. Therefore, it was hypothesized that faced with high time pressure, 
participants who scored high on Conscientiousness would use less effective metacognitive 
strategies (i.e., would not choose to allocate more study time to judged-easy passages) compared 
to participants who scored low on Conscientiousness.  
The results of this study did not confirm this hypothesis. When examining the entire 
sample, participants high on Conscientiousness were more likely to allocate study-time to 
judged-interesting material, regardless of time pressure. Though the interaction between time 
pressure and Conscientiousness was not significant, when participants high on Conscientiousness 
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has more time, they had a tendency to allocate study-time to judged-interesting passages to a 
greater degree than when they had less time. Though allocating more study-time to judged-
interesting material is arguably an effective strategy, this is the opposite of the trend that would 
be expected if these participants were behaving strategically. As stated earlier, it is again possible 
that participants high on Conscientiousness were not behaving strategically in order to improve 
test performance, rather, they were making these decisions while studying as a means to make 
the experiment more enjoyable by choosing material that was interesting to them.  
However, once the participants who did not initially view any of the passages as difficult 
to learn were removed from the analyses, people high on Conscientiousness actually 
implemented effective metacognitive strategies, such that they allocated time to judged-easy 
passages regardless of time pressure. Though this finding was not significant, it suggests a trend 
that is contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore, this finding coupled with the finding the people 
high on Conscientiousness allocated more time to passages they found interesting, suggests those 
high on Conscientiousness had an identifiable approach to the task compared to those lower on 
Conscientiousness. Firstly, they potentially tried to make the task more meaningful by reading 
material they found interesting. Secondly, for those participants who were both high on 
Conscientiousness and perceived the passages as difficult, they implemented an effective 
metacognitive strategy by choosing to study easy material.   
Additionally, Son and Metcalfe (2000) found that participants chose to allocate more 
study-time to judged-interesting material over judged-easy material when they were not 
expecting a test. Though participants in this study were expecting a test, it is possible that they 
approached the task as if they were reading for some other purpose than preparing for an exam 
and they might not have cared about their test performance, as discussed earlier.  
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In considering the impact of Conscientiousness on metacognitive strategies in this study, 
is important to consider the frequency of personality traits in the sample. The sample consisted of 
undergraduate students from Columbia University, which is a highly selective institution and 
arguably its students are among the most intelligent in the country. Though the sample was likely 
highly intelligent, the results from the self-report measure of personality indicates that they were 
not very conscientious and thus there was a restricted range. A small number of the participants 
(n = 25) rated themselves as “High” or “Very High” on Conscientiousness, and an even smaller 
number of participants (n = 11) rated themselves as “Very High.” It is possible there were not 
enough people high on Conscientiousness in the sample to observe any differences in 
metacognitive strategy use as a function of Conscientiousness.  
As stated above, the finding that Conscientiousness is negatively related to performance 
is only observed with high levels of the trait (Cucina & Vasilopulos, 2005). It is also possible 
that only people “Very High” on Conscientiousness struggle to use effective metacognitive 
strategies when faced with time constraints. There were only five participants in the high time 
pressure condition who rated themselves as “Very High” on Conscientiousness, so this 
relationship could not be fully explored.  
Again, some researchers speculate that Conscientiousness serves as a compensatory 
mechanism for average intelligence (Moutafi, Furnham, & Crump, 2003; Chamorro-Premuzic & 
Furnham, 2004; Wood & Englert, 2009). However, as already stated, a sample of Columbia 
undergraduate students likely have above average intelligence compared to the general 
population. Therefore, it is possible that people high on Conscientiousness in this sample are also 
highly intelligent, so they are both high achievers because they are motivated and work hard and 
because they have an aptitude to be successful academically. Intellectual ability, in this sample, 
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may have compensated for potential ineffective metacognitive strategy for those high on 
Conscientiousness.   
 
Personality Traits and Test Performance 
 Openness. Characteristics that describe Openness include intellectual, independent-
minded, and imaginative. In addition to Conscientiousness, some studies have also found a 
relationship between Openness and academic performance (Farsides & Woodfield, 2003; 
Lounsbury et al., 2003; Lounsbury et al., 2005). However, this association is explained by 
Openness as being more related to academic ability or aptitude, where the association between 
Conscientiousness and academic performance is more related to motivation or perseverance 
(Goff & Ackermann, 1992; Noftle & Robbins, 2001; Conrad 2006). Similarly, some researchers 
argue that Openness overlaps highly with intellectual ability (Ackerman & Heggested, 1997). 
The results from this dissertation support the relationship between Openness and intellectual 
ability, as well as Openness and academic performance. Firstly, Openness was significantly 
correlated to GPA. Secondly, Openness was a significant predictor of test performance, 
regardless of time pressure.  
Again, when considering the frequency of personality traits in the sample, 91 participants 
rated themselves as “High” or “Very High” on Openness, and zero rated themselves as “Very 
Low.” If Openness does overlap with intellectual ability, it makes sense that there was such a 
high frequency of Open participants in a sample of Columbia undergraduate students. 
Extraversion. Characteristics that describe Extraversion include sociable, friendly, and 
dominant. The relationship between Extraversion and academic performance is inconclusive, 
which may be explained by how academic performance has been operationalized. A positive 
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relationship between Extraversion and academic performance in MBA students was found when 
performance was based on participation (Rothstein, 1994), whereas a negative relationship was 
found when examining GPA (Bauer & Liang, 2003, Furnam et al., 2003, Goff and Ackerman, 
1992) and exam grades (Hair & Hampson, 2006; Furnham & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2004). 
Arguably students high on Extraversion spend more time socializing, both during and outside of 
class, whereas individuals low on Extraversion (or introverts) spend more time studying 
(Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2005). 
Findings from this dissertation revealed a negative relationship between Extraversion and 
test performance, which supports the aforementioned studies that people high on Extraversion 
have lower GPAs and exam grades. However, in this sample, Extraversion and GPA were not 
related. While participants in the study did not necessarily have an opportunity to socialize while 
completing the experiment, it is possible these individuals in general spend more time engaging 
in social interactions and less time studying, resulting in lower test performance. Either people 
high on Extraversion self-select into classes or areas of study that rely more on participation, or 
these individuals spend less time engaging in studying or solitary activities (e.g., reading), which 
potentially results in less background knowledge, and more time engaging in social activities. 
 
Implicit Theories of Intelligence and Study-Time Allocation 
 The implicit theory of intelligence states that people’s beliefs about their own intelligence 
potentially alters their judgments of learning when faced with tasks of varying difficulty, which 
in turn impacts their effort (Dweck,1999; Molden & Dweck, 2006). People’s theories about their 
own intelligence impact their interpretations of how well they understand and comprehend new 
material, as well as their perception of their capability to understand new material (Dweck, 1999; 
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Dweck & Leggett, 1988). While there is a supported relationship between implicit theories of 
intelligence and academic outcomes (Blackwell et al., 2007; Henderson & Dweck, 1990; Dweck 
& Leggett, 1988), the relationship between theories of intelligence and metacognitive strategies 
is unclear. However, there is reason to believe there may be a negative relationship between an 
incremental view and metacognition. A paramount characteristic of incrementalists is increased 
effort when faced with difficult tasks. As previously discussed, effort to persevere on challenging 
items is an ineffective study strategy when faced with time pressure. Relatedly, people who 
scored high on Conscientiousness were more likely to report an incremental theory of 
intelligence (Furnham, et al., 2003). As such, it was hypothesized that when faced with time 
pressure, participants who identify with an incremental theory of intelligence would use less 
effective metacognitive strategies (i.e., would not choose to allocate more study time to judged-
easy passages) compared to participants who identified with an entity theory of intelligence. 
Additionally, it was hypothesized that participants who identify with an incremental theory of 
intelligence would also rate themselves high on Conscientiousness.  
The dissertation did not confirm either of these hypotheses. Participants who identified 
with an incremental theory of intelligence did not use less effective strategies compared to 
participants who identified with an entity theory of intelligence when faced with time pressure. 
Further, when those participants who did not view the material as difficult were removed from 
the analyses, people who clearly identified with an incremental theory of intelligence actually 
allocated study-time to judged-easy material compared to people who clearly identified with an 
entity theory of intelligence, who allocated study-time to judged-difficult material. This finding 
is the reverse from the hypothesis, in that people with an incremental theory of intelligence 
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actually used effective metacognitive strategies, and they did so to a stronger degree when faced 
with time pressure. 
When the entire sample is considered, there was also a significant interaction between 
implicit theories of intelligence and the time pressure condition for the relationship between JOIs 
and study-time allocation. However, this interaction was only apparent when participants who 
did not clearly identify with either theory were included in the analysis. When faced with time 
pressure, participants who identified more with an incremental theory of intelligence were more 
likely to allocate study-time to judged-interesting passages compared to participants who did not 
identify with an incremental theory of intelligence (i.e., identified with an entity theory of 
intelligence or did not identify with either theory), who were more likely to allocate more study-
time to judged-boring passages.  Allocating more study-time to judged-interesting passages when 
faced with time pressure might also be an effective metacognitive strategy because 1) material 
perceived as more interesting also tends to be perceived as easier and, 2) selecting material that 
is believed to be useful or relevant under time pressure might be an effective use of study time. 
This finding, coupled with the finding that people who both identified with an 
incremental theory and initially perceived the passages as difficult further support that these 
individuals demonstrated effective metacognitive strategy use. In contrast, people who both had 
a clear entity theory and perceived the initial passages as difficult allocated study-time to judged-
difficult passages, regardless of time pressure. Additionally, people who did not identify with an 
incremental theory, which included people who identified with an entity theory and people who 
did not identify with either theory, were more likely to allocate study-time to judged-boring 
passages under time pressure. This indicates that people with an entity theory or without a clear 
incremental theory if intelligence implemented ineffective metacognitive strategies.  
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People with an incremental theory of intelligence tend to have learning goals, which 
focus on increasing competence and are associated with increased effort and adaptation of 
strategies (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Elliott & Dweck, 1988). Therefore, it makes sense that a 
person who identifies with an incremental theory of intelligence would try to study material they 
thought was easy and interesting, or relevant and useful in order to increase competence (or test 
scores), especially when they had limited time to read the passages, compared to people who do 
not identify with an incremental theory of intelligence.  
In contrast, people with an entity theory of intelligence tend to have performance goals, 
which focus on gaining favorable judgments from others of their competence (Dweck & Leggett, 
1988; Elliott & Dweck, 1988). Though it was opposite to the trend that was expected, it is 
possible that people with an entity theory of intelligence in this study chose to study difficult and 
boring passages because they wanted to be perceived as competent, and mastery of difficult 
material suggests competency. It is possible these approaches were a result of these individuals 
attempting to be strategic.  
It was also hypothesized that participants who identified with an incremental theory of 
intelligence would rate themselves high on Conscientiousness. Contrary to this hypothesis, those 
two constructs were not related. Openness was significantly and positively correlated with an 
implicit theory of intelligence, such that participants high on Openness were more likely to have 
an incremental theory of intelligence. Though this was not hypothesized, it makes sense given 
the relationship between incremental theories of intelligence and academic outcomes. 
Additionally, similar to the frequency of Open participants in the sample, the majority of 
participants identified with an incremental theory of intelligence (n = 77). This suggests that 
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overall, the sample for the study consisted of very Open individuals who also identified with an 
incremental theory of intelligence. 
It is also interesting to note that an implicit view of intelligence was significantly and 
positively related to age, such that older participants were more likely to have an incremental 
theory of intelligence. This could be because older students may have had more opportunities to 
be exposed to ideas that align with an incremental theory of intelligence, or that older students 
have had more experiences that suggest that intelligence is malleable and effort increases ability 
and performance.  
 
Implicit Theories of Intelligence and Test Performance  
 Participant’s beliefs about their intelligence were not related to their test performance, 
despite a tendency for participants with an incremental theory of intelligence tendency to allocate 
more study time to interesting material under time pressure. However, the interaction between 
time pressure and implicit theories of intelligence approached significance (p = .08). This trend 
suggests participants in the low time pressure condition who identified with an incremental 
theory of intelligence obtained higher test scores than participants who identified with an 
incremental theory of intelligence in the high time pressure condition. Participants who did not 
clearly identify with a theory of intelligence also obtained higher test scores in the low time 
pressure condition compared to the high time pressure condition. In contrast, the test scores of 
participants who identified with an entity theory of intelligence did not change as a function of 
time pressure. Again, it makes sense that participants test performance increases when they have 
more time to study. However, it is interesting that this was not necessarily the case for 
participants who identified with an entity theory of intelligence. This is consistent with previous 
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findings that people with an entity theory withdraw or give up when faced with challenges since 
they believe they do not have enough intelligence (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). On this task, it is 
possible that participants with an entity theory did not put forth effort on test items they did not 
know, which decreased their performance, where other participants’ lower performance was only 
observed as a function of not having enough time to study. Additionally, as previously 
mentioned, only a small proportion of participants identified with an entity theory (n = 20). It is 
possible this interaction would have been stronger with more entity theorists in the sample.  
 
Implications and Future Research 
 There are many circumstances, both in academic and work contexts, where the ability to 
use effective metacognitive strategies when faced with real-life time constraints are necessary in 
order to efficiently complete tasks. The goal of this dissertation was to further explore those traits 
that might enhance or inhibit an individual’s ability to behave strategically in such 
circumstances. Is the ability to behave strategically under time constraints a skill that can be 
taught, or is this something that you either have the capacity to do or not? While the results from 
this study did not clearly answer this question, the findings revealed ways in which this notion 
can be explored further. 
 Exploration of Individual Differences. Firstly, in terms of individual differences in 
metacognition, future studies should continue to focus on the construct of Conscientiousness as it 
relates to metacognitive strategy use under time constraints. The current study indicated that 
people high on Conscientiousness allocate more time to material they find interesting, as well as 
more time to passages they found easy once participants who did not find any of the material 
challenging were removed from the data. This was opposite to the trend that was expected, but 
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further research should be conducted with a sample that contains a less restricted range for the 
variable of Conscientious. Additionally, limitations in passage variability and testing conditions 
may have impacted participants’ approach to the task and restricted the range even further, which 
will be discussed further in the next section. If participants were more invested in doing well on 
the test and if the passages varied more in difficulty, then potentially some of these trends would 
be stronger.  
Conscientious individuals in the current study allocated more time to materials they 
perceived as interesting and easy regardless of time pressure. Moreover, the degree to which 
these individuals allocated more study-time to interesting materials increased when they had 
more time. These findings speak to how Conscientious individuals approach academic tasks. 
While this trait is associated with being hardworking, motivated, and reliable, they may also 
have more intrinsic motivation to learn than has been previously assumed, which also leads to 
positive academic outcomes. For instance, people who are Conscientious might be more 
motivated because they are driven by an internal desire to learn. As such, they make studying 
choices based on what is interesting and enjoyable to them, and easier, more accessible material 
is arguably more enjoyable to learn. This notion should be explored further, potentially as it 
relates to Conscientious individuals having learning-approach goals, another motivational 
construct (Elliott & Dweck, 1988).  
The relationship between incremental theories of intelligence and metacognition needs to 
be explored further with regard to how these individuals approach novel learning tasks. This 
study revealed that individuals who identified with an incremental theory of intelligence were 
more likely to allocate study time to materials they found interesting compared to individuals 
who did not identify with an incremental theory, but this was seen only when faced with time 
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pressure. Additionally, when looking at people who initially perceived some of the passages as 
difficult to learn, those with a clear incremental theory allocated study-time to materials they 
found easy to a significantly greater degree than people with an entity theory of intelligence, who 
allocated study-time to materials they found difficult.  Similar to those individuals high on 
Conscientiousness, this finding potentially also suggests that the incrementalists in this study 
were more intrinsically motivated to learn. However, they arguably acted more strategically than 
individuals who were high on Conscientious since their tendency to do this increased as a 
function of time pressure and the findings were significant. In contrast, people who did not 
identify with an incremental theory, which include people who identified with an entity theory 
and people who did not identify with either theory, allocated more time to materials they found 
boring under time pressure and to passages they found difficult regardless of time pressure.  It is 
possible this approach was a result of these individuals attempting to be strategic. Perhaps 
material perceived as boring was also perceived as unfamiliar, so they exhibited a stronger 
tendency to study the boring, unfamiliar material under time constraints. Again, it would be 
interesting to see how this motivational construct relates to learning versus performance goals 
(Elliott & Dweck, 1988). While the relationship between these two motivational constructs has 
already been explored (Dweck & Leggett, 1988), this relationship in the context of 
metacognitive strategy use under time pressure should be further investigated in future studies. 
Exploration of Potential Interventions. Given what was found about characteristics 
associated with people high on Conscientiousness and people who identified with the 
incremental theory of intelligence, future research should also focus on whether these traits can 
be taught in a way that impacts people’s studying behaviors. There is already research supporting 
the effectiveness of interventions aimed at teaching an incremental theory of intelligence in the 
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improvement of academic outcomes (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Blackwell et al., 2007; 
Good, Aronson & Inzlicht, 2003). Would a similar intervention be effective in improving 
students’ ability to be efficient with their time when it is not possible to complete all tasks? 
In addition to allocation of study-time to interesting materials, findings from this 
dissertation also revealed that certain personality traits were related to test performance. 
Specifically, Openness significantly contributed to increased test performance, and Extraversion 
significantly contributed to decreased test performance. Though there is support for the 
relationship between Openness and intelligence (Goff & Ackermann, 1992; Noftle & Robbins, 
2001; Conrad 2006), it is possible that the characteristics associated with Openness can inform 
interventions and increase motivation. For instance, people who are high on Openness are open 
to new experiences and have an appreciation for new and different ideas. As such, it is logical 
that these individuals are also more intellectual since they engage in a broader and more diverse 
range of activities. If people were privy to the idea that being open to new experiences and ideas 
was related to being more intelligent, it would be interesting to see how this knowledge might 
impact motivation when engaging in academic activities.  
Though Extraversion was negatively related to test performance, how can this 
information be used to better inform learning outcomes? Another interesting idea to explore 
would be to see if people high on Extraversion perform better on evaluative methods outside of 
multiple-choice tests, since research supporting a positive relationship between Extraversion and 
academic achievement were based on grades for participation and not on test performance. It is 
possible that people high on Extraversion understand the material but are not apt at taking tests, 
so it would be interesting to use evaluative methods that capitalize on characteristics associated 
with being extraverted, such as more social, interpersonal tasks. For example, had the studying of 
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passages been more of a cooperative learning activity, where participants taught each other the 
material in a group format, would they have performed better compared to people who low on 
Extraversion?  
Though it was not statistically significant, people who identified with an entity theory of 
intelligence did not improve their test performance when they had more time to study. Given the 
known association between having an entity theory of intelligence and effort, in that people with 
an entity theory view academic challenges as indication they lack the innate ability (Dweck & 
Leggett; Dweck, 1999), as well as the success of interventions aimed at teaching an incremental 
theory of intelligence (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Blackwell et al., 2007; Good, Aronson & 
Inzlicht, 2003), this trend offers more support for the importance of such interventions.  
 Lastly, beyond using characteristics from the traits themselves to inform interventions, it 
would be interesting to explore effective metacognitive strategy use in and of itself as an 
intervention. If people are first taught the Region of Proximal Learning model and the potential 
advantages of allocating more study-time to easy material, would that influence their actual 
studying behavior, and would there be observable differences in their subsequent test 
performance?   
 In summary, future research needs to be conducted to further explore the primary 
variables of interest from this study (Conscientiousness and implicit theories of intelligence), as 
well as the traits that were identified as contributing to test performance (Extraversion and 
Openness). Research should focus both on the relationship between these traits and learning 






 As with any study, there are a few limitations that potentially impacted the findings. As 
previously discussed, participants in this study were Columbia University undergraduates. There 
were a few characteristics of the sample that may have limited the results. Firstly, the sample was 
skewed in the frequency of personality traits. Secondly, most participants in the sample likely 
had above average intellectual abilities, which suggests the results might not be generalizable to 
other adults outside of Columbia. Ideally, the sample should have consisted of young adults with 
more variability in intellectual and academic functioning.  
While the passages varied enough in interest, the passages did not vary enough in 
difficulty for participants to behave systematically. Though variability in difficulty and interest 
was a priority in passage selection, it is possible more stringent guidelines to determine 
variability could have been implemented. For example, objective measures of difficulty could 
have been used to select passages in terms of difficulty. Though subjective judgments would still 
be used in the actual experiment, this would have provided a starting point to ensure variability 
in difficulty. Ensuring passages varied in interest is more difficult to determine. However, 
instead of using passages that interested graduate students who are all in the same field, we could 
have recruited a more diverse group of people to select passages. Additionally, they should have 
been instructed to select passages that are both interesting and boring to them.  
Another potential limitation in this study was the amount of time allocated to participants 
in each condition. As previously discussed, it is possible that participants in the high time 
pressure condition did not experience enough of a time constraint to be forced to make 
metacognitive decisions while studying, especially given the finding that the passages were not 
perceived as very difficult. Though there was enough of a difference in time allotted to impact 
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test performance, it did not appear to impact metacognitive strategy use. Additionally, while 
there were some findings that suggest people in the high time pressure condition used their 
metacognitive judgments, this finding was moderated by another variable (JOI), and was not 
apparent for EOL judgments. The rate at which people study and learn is highly variable, and 
time allotted to participants in each condition should have been more individualized. More 
specifically, there could have been an individualized approach to determine what was perceived 
as a time constraint and what was not for each participant based on rate of learning. For instance, 
participants could have been timed reading a passage prior to starting the experiment to get a 
sense of the rate at which they read. A manipulation check at the end of the study regarding 
perceived time pressure may have been helpful in determining whether this was part of the 
reason findings did not replicate the Son and Metcalfe (2000) study. Further, time allotted to 
participants in the study was determined using pilot data. Participants in the pilot study were 
graduate students, so it is possible that time to read passages observed in the pilot study did not 
generalize to undergraduate students.  
Lastly, though the experiment aimed to create a realistic studying and testing conditions, 
there are limitations to how these conditions generalize to actual studying and testing conditions. 
More specifically, it is possible participants were not invested in the experiment and/or doing 
well on the test. Motivation could have been increased by involving some sort of incentive to do 
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Univariate ANOVAs Comparing Metacognitive Judgments and Study-Time (Gamma 
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 F-value p-value 
JOI and Study-Time (n = 80) .25 .62 
EOL and Study-Time (n = 73) 1.59 .21 
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Assessment of Implicit Theories of Intelligence1 
 
These questions have been designed to investigate ideas about intelligence. There are no right or 
wrong answers. We are interested in your ideas.  Using the scale below, please indicate the 
extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements by selecting the 
number that corresponds to your opinion in the space next to each statement. 
 
1=Strong Agree    2=Agree   3=Mostly Agree  4=Mostly Disagree   5=Disagree   6=Strongly 
Disagree 
You have a certain amount of intelligence and you really can’t do much to change it. 
Your intelligence is something about you that you can’t change very much. 
You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence. 
 





































*All passages are excerpts from Wikipedia articles. Wikipedia is a freely licensed encyclopedia, 
so its content can be copied and used for any purpose. 
 
Angkor Wat (190 words) 
Angkor Wat (or "Capital Temple") is a temple complex in Cambodia and the largest religious 
monument in the world. It was originally founded as a Hindu temple for the Khmer Empire, 
gradually transforming into a Buddhist temple toward the end of the 12th century. It was built by 
the Khmer King Suryavarman II in the early 12th century in Yaśodharapura (present-day 
Angkor), the capital of the Khmer Empire, as his state temple and eventual mausoleum. Breaking 
from the Shaiva tradition of previous kings, Angkor Wat was instead dedicated to Vishnu. As the 
best-preserved temple at the site, it is the only one to have remained a significant religious center 
since its foundation. The temple is at the top of the high classical style of Khmer architecture. It 
has become a symbol of Cambodia, appearing on its national flag, and it is the country's prime 
attraction for visitors. The modern name, Angkor Wat, means "Temple City" or "City of 
Temples" in Khmer; Angkor, meaning "city" or "capital city", is a vernacular form of the word 
nokor, which comes from the Sanskrit word nagara. Wat is the Khmer word for "temple 
grounds." 
 
Emergency Banking Act (193 words) 
The Emergency Banking Act (the official title of which was the Emergency Banking Relief Act), 
Public Law 1, 48 Stat. 1 (March 9, 1933), was an act passed by the United States Congress in 
1933 in an attempt to stabilize the banking system. Beginning on February 14 of that 
year, Michigan, which had been hit particularly hard by the Great Depression, declared an eight-
day bank holiday. Fears of other bank closures spread from state to state as people rushed to 
withdraw their money. Within weeks, thirty-six other states held their own bank holidays in an 
attempt to stem the bank runs. The banking system seemed to be on the verge of collapse. 
Following his inauguration in March 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt set out to rebuild 
confidence in the nation's banking system, first declaring a four-day banking holiday that shut 
down the banking system, including the Federal Reserve. Prepared by the Treasury staff 
during Herbert Hoover's administration, the legislation was passed on March 9, 1933. The new 
law allowed the twelve Federal Reserve Banks to issue additional currency on good assets so that 
banks that reopened would be able to meet every legitimate call. 
 
Infinite Jest (132 words) 
Infinite Jest is a 1996 novel by David Foster Wallace. The lengthy and complex work takes place 
in a North American dystopia, centering on a junior tennis academy and a nearby substance-
abuse recovery center. The novel touches on many topics, including addiction and recovery, 
family relationships, entertainment and advertising, film theory, United States-Canada relations 
(as well as Quebec separatism), and tennis. The novel includes 388 endnotes that cap almost a 
thousand pages of prose, which, together with its detailed fictional world, have led to its 
categorization as an encyclopedic novel.  In 2005 it was included by Time magazine in its list of 
the 100 best English-language novels published since 1923. By 2006, 150,000 copies of Infinite 




Magnetohydrodynamics (123 words) 
Magnetohydrodynamics is the study of the magnetic properties of electrically conducting fluids. 
Examples of such magneto-fluids include plasmas, liquid metals, and salt water or electrolytes. 
The word magnetohydrodynamics (MHD) is derived from magneto- meaning magnetic 
field, hydro- meaning water, and -dynamics meaning movement. The field of MHD was initiated 
by Hannes Alfvén for which he received the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1970. The fundamental 
concept behind MHD is that magnetic fields can induce currents in a moving conductive fluid, 
which in turn polarizes the fluid and reciprocally changes the magnetic field itself. The set of 
equations that describe MHD are a combination of the Navier-Stokes equations of fluid 
dynamics and Maxwell's equations of electromagnetism. These differential equations must be 
solved simultaneously, either analytically or numerically 
 
Rococo Movement (175 words) 
Rococo, less commonly roccoco, or "Late Baroque", is an 18th-century artistic movement and 
style, affecting many aspects of the arts including painting, sculpture, architecture, interior 
design, decoration, literature, music, and theatre. It developed in the early 18th century in Paris, 
France as a reaction against the grandeur, symmetry, and strict regulations of the Baroque, 
especially of the Palace of Versailles. Rococo artists and architects used a more jocular, florid, 
and graceful approach to the Baroque. Their style was ornate and used light colors, asymmetrical 
designs, curves, and gold. Unlike the political Baroque, the Rococo had playful and witty 
themes. The interior decoration of Rococo rooms was designed as a total work of art with elegant 
and ornate furniture, small sculptures, ornamental mirrors, and tapestry complementing 
architecture, reliefs, and wall paintings. The Rococo was also important in theatre. The book The 
Rococo states that no other culture "has produced a wittier, more elegant, and teasing dialogue 
full of elusive and camouflaging language and gestures, refined feelings and subtle criticism" 
than Rococo theatre, especially that of France.  
 
Succulent Plants (123 words) 
In botany, succulent plants, also known as succulents or sometimes fat plants, are plants having 
some parts that are more than normally thickened and fleshy, usually to retain water 
in arid climates or soil conditions. The word "succulent" comes from the Latin word sucus, 
meaning juice, or sap.[1] Succulent plants may store water in various structures, such 
as leaves and stems. Some definitions also include roots, so that geophytes that survive 
unfavorable periods by dying back to underground storage organs may be regarded as succulents. 
In horticultural use, the term "succulent" is often used in a way which excludes plants that 
botanists would regard as succulents, such as cacti. Succulents are often grown as ornamental 
plants because of their striking and unusual appearance. 
 
Video Game Addiction (192 words) 
Video game addiction is hypothesized to be an excessive or compulsive use of computer 
games or video games, which interferes with a person's everyday life. Video game addiction may 
present itself as compulsive game-playing; social isolation; mood swings; 
diminished imagination; and hyper-focus on in-game achievements, to the exclusion of other 
events in life. In May 2013, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) proposed criteria for 
video game addiction in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), 
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concluding that there was insufficient evidence to include it as an official mental disorder. 
However, proposed criteria for "Internet Gaming Disorder" are included in Section 3, Conditions 
for Further Study. While Internet Gaming Disorder is proposed as a disorder, it is still discussed 
how much this disorder is caused by the gaming activity itself, or whether it is to some extent an 
effect of other disorders. Researchers have found that people who play violent video games for 
three days have shown an increase with their aggressive behavior and hostility. These findings 
are disputed by multiple sources however. They have also found that individuals who play 
nonviolent games showed no difference in their aggression or hostility.  
 
William T. G. Morton (171 words) 
William Thomas Green Morton was an American dentist who first publicly demonstrated the use 
of inhaled ether as a surgical anesthetic in 1846. The promotion of his questionable claim to have 
been the discoverer of anesthesia became an obsession for the rest of his life. On September 30, 
1846, Morton performed a painless tooth extraction after administering ether to a patient. Upon 
reading a favorable newspaper account of this event, Boston surgeon Henry Jacob Bigelow 
arranged for a now-famous demonstration of ether on October 16, 1846 at the operating 
theater of the Massachusetts General Hospital, or MGH. At this demonstration Dr. John Collins 
Warren painlessly removed a tumor from the neck of a Mr. Edward Gilbert Abbott. News of this 
use of ether spread rapidly around the world, and the first recorded use of ether in Britain was 
by Robert Liston at University College Hospital on 21 December 1846. The MGH theatre came 





























Multiple Choice Test 
 
Angkor Wat 
1. The city of Yasodharupura… 
a. Means “Temple City” 
b. Is the capital of Cambodia  
c. No longer exists 
d. Comes from the Sanskrit word “nagara” 




d. King Suryavarman II 




d. Sri Lanka 
4. What was Angkor Wat? 
a. A state temple 
b. A mausoleum 
c. A residence 
d. A and B 
5. The Shaiva tradition... 
a. Is no longer followed in Cambodia 
b. Was not strictly followed during the construction of Angkor Wat 
c. Remains an important cornerstone in Cambodian culture 
d. Was rejected by the people of Cambodia during King Suryavarman II’s Reign 
6. The word “Angkor” is Khmer for… 
a. “Temple” 
b. “Temple Grounds” 
c. “Temple City” 
d. “City” 
 
Emergency Banking Act 







2. Why did the Federal Reserve Banks issue additional currency? 
a. To increase the value of the U.S. Dollar 
b. To ensure banks had enough money once they reopened 
c. To create additional jobs 
d. To fund public works projects 
3. Fears of bank closures led people to… 
a. Rush to withdraw money from the bank 
b. Hide money and assets from the government 
c. Stop paying taxes 
d. Vote in favor of the Emergency Banking Act 
4. Who prepared the Emergency Banking Act? 
a. Franklin Roosevelt’s Treasury staff 
b. the Federal Reserve 
c. the U.S. Congress 
d. Herbert Hoover’s Treasury staff 
5. Which of the following is NOT true about President Franklin Roosevelt? 
a. He was the first to implement a banking holiday anywhere in the US 
b. He relied on work from President Hoover’s administration 
c. He prioritized the economic issues of the 1930’s 
d. He implemented a plan that increased banks’ ability to dispense funds 







1. What feature of the novel led to it being categorized as an encyclopedic novel? 
a. It includes more than 350 endnotes 
b. Discussions of United States-Canada relations 
c. It’s unbiased account of Quebec separatism 
d. It includes photographs with detailed captions  
2. Which publication gave “Infinite Jest” praise in 2005? 
a. New York Magazine 
b. Wall Street Journal 
c. Times Magazine 
d. New York Times 
3. Who wrote “Infinite Jest?” 
a. David Allen Grier 
b. David Foster Wallace 
c. David Hyde Pierce 
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d. David Mark Wolf 
4. “Infinite Jest”… 
a. is widely considered to be the best work of encyclopedic fiction since 1923 
b. has enjoyed relatively successful sales since its release 
c. has endured extended periods of both critical acclaim and rebuke 
d. has only recently seen a surge in sales following critical acclaim 
5. What two settings does the novel take place? 
a. A junior tennis academy and a parochial high school 
b. A parochial high school and a substance-abuse recovery center 
c. A substance-abuse recovery center and an all girls preparatory school 
d. A junior tennis academy and a substance-abuse recovery center 
6. “Infinite Jest”...  
a. is a work of fiction  
b. is a memoir  
c. is based on 1980s events in North America 
d. is a short novel 
 
Magnetohydrodynamics 





2. Part of the fundamental concept of magnetohydrodynamics is… 
a. Magnetic fields initiate temperature changes in fluids 
b. Magnetic fields bring about electric currents in fluids that are electrically 
conducting  
c. Electrical currents in fluids attract and repel magnetic particles 
d. The movement of magnetic particles in water is brought about by polarization 
3. Magnetohydrodynamics... 
a. can be modeled with a set of complex equations 
b. operates on physical mechanisms that are still mostly unknown 
c. represents a burgeoning field in physics  
d. has contributed significantly to recent advances in consumer products 
4. Hannes Alfven received a Nobel Prize in which field(s)? 
a. Chemistry 
b. Physics and Chemistry 
c. Engineering 
d. Physics 
      5.    Magnetohydrodynamnics is the study of… 
a. Magnetic properties of electrically conducting fluids 
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b. Magnetic properties of thermal retention in water 
c. Movement of magnetic particles through fluids 
d. Dynamics of electric magnetic particles 
     6.      Navier-Stokes equations are… 
a. Equations of thermodynamics 
b. Equations of fluid dynamics 
c. Equations of electromagnetism 
d. Equations of magneto-fluids 
    
 
Rococo Movement 
1. The political Baroque would most likely be characterized as having… 
a. Playful themes 
b. Unorthodox themes 
c. Light hearted themes 
d. Strict and stern themes 




d. England  
3. Rococo was a reaction to… 
a. Asymmetrical designs of the Baroque period 
b. The Palace of Versailles 
c. Strict regulations of the Baroque period 
d. Florid and graceful approaches of the Late Baroque period 
4. What century was the Rococo Movement? 
a. 16th century 
b. 17th century 
c. 18th century 
d. 19th century 
5. Features of Rococo interior design include… 
a. Rooms as a total work of art 
b. Ornate and asymmetrical designs 
c. Symmetrical and precise designs 
d. A and B 
6. Rococo Theater... 
a. was known for its topical, scathing satire 
b. was known for its sophistication and humor 
c. was known for its deep dramatic plots 





1. Succulents are also known as… 
a. Cacti  
b. Fat plants 
c. Flesh plants 
d. Juicy plants 
2. Succulent plants’ most notable adaptation would be 
a. its effective water management system 
b. its rapid water absorption 
c. its efficient water circulation 
d. its reduced water consumption rate 





4. According to the passage, why are succulents often grown as ornamental plants? 
a. Because they are easy to care for 
b. Because of their scent 
c. Because of their appearance 
d. Because they require little sunlight 




d. spiney  
6. Why are succulent parts fleshy? 
a. To retain water 
b. To protect against animals 
c. To absorb more sunlight 
d. To attract insects for pollination 
 
Video Game Addiction 
1. According to the passage, researchers have found that individuals who play nonviolent 
games… 
a. Showed an increase in their aggression or hostility  
b. Showed an increase in spatial reasoning ability 
c. Showed a decrease in spatial reasoning ability 
d. Showed no difference in their aggression or hostility 
2. Which of the following would NOT necessarily be symptoms of video game addiction? 
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a. Playing video games with a friend every day 
b. Skipping meals to play video games 
c. Choosing to play video games instead of attending appointments 
d. Throwing a daily tantrum when a parent attempts to end a video game session 
3. What year was Video Game Addiction proposed as an official mental disorder by the 





4. What is true of “Internet Gaming Disorder…” 
a. It it included in the Conditions for Further Study section of the DSM 
b. It is caused exclusively by gaming activity  
c. It is caused by depression 
d. It is included in the Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders section of the 
DSM 
5. The American Psychiatric Association... 
a. is funding Video Game Addiction support groups 
b. is encouraging new research on Video Game Addiction 
c. determined that there is no link between violent behavior and amount of time 
playing video games 
d. determined that exposure to violent video games should be limited in young 
adults 
6. According to the passage, which of the following is not a way video game addiction 
presents? 
a. Compulsive game-playing 
b. Mood swings 
c. Acute weight gain 
d. Social isolation 
 
William Thomas Green Morton 
1. What is the Massachusetts General Hospital Theater known as? 
a. The Ether Theater 
b. The Painless Dome 
c. The Ether Dome 
d. The Painless Theater 




d. Cannot be determined 
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3. Demonstrations of the use of ether in 1846 focused on: 
a.       Tooth extractions 
b.      Tumor extractions 
c.       Amputations 
d.      Both a and b 





5. Who is John Collins Warren? 
a. A doctor who publicly demonstrated the use of ether for painless surgery 
b. A doctor who arranged for a public demonstration of the use of ether for painless 
surgery 
c. The first patient to undergo surgery with ether 
d. The first doctor in the UK to use ether for painless surgery 
6. What did William Thomas Green Morton allegedly perform while using ether? 
a. A painless tumor removal 
b. A painless appendix removal 
c. A painless ulcer removal 
d. A painless tooth removal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
Appendix G 
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